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Overall Introduction
This report documents work performed under Task 2 of NASA Contract
NAS1-17067. The work continues the work of task 1 into the architectural basis
for an advanced fault tolerant on-board computer that will be the successor to
the current generation of fault tolerant computers (SIFT and FTMP).
The work is reported here in four chapters:
• Chapter 1 contains an extended study of the NETS Network Error Tolerant
System architecture, with particular attention to intercluster configurations
and communication protocols, and to refined reliability estimates.
• Chapter 2 discusses the diagnosis of faults, so that appropriate choices for
reconfiguration can be made. The analysis relates particularly to the recogni-
tion of transient faults in a system with tasks at many levels of priority.
• Chapter 3 describes a novel architecture for computer systems, the demand
driven data-flow architecture, which appears to have possible application in
fault tolerant systems.
• Chapter 4 reports on work investigating the feasibility of automatic generation
of aircraft flight control programs from abstract specifications.
Chapter 1
NETS: Network Error-Tolerant System
Introduction
For the past 10 years NASA-Langley has been supporting the development
of two fault-tolerant computers (SIFT and FTMP), prototypes of which are cur-
rently under evaluation as part of Langley's AirLab test facility. Although both
SIFT and FTMP provide a reliability in the presence of permanent and transient
hardware failures that far exceeds what is obtainable with conventional unrepli-
cated computers, there remain deficiencies that appear to be inherent to the un-
derlying architectural concepts. Among the deficiencies are:
• Limited capability for expansion beyond approximately 16 processors
• Limited capability to accommodate different processor types, including spe-
cial purpose processors
• No immunity to transient faults that temporarily disable several processors
The basic problems with SIFT and FTMP are that, although they are mul-
ticomputers providing reliability through redundancy, fault-masking and logical
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removal of faulty processors, they employ the centralized computer technology e
available when the designs commenced in the 70's. In particular, they require
reasonably tight synchronization among all processors and direct communication
between each pair of processors. The solution to these deficiencies appears to
be a more distributed concept, employing the newly available distributed system
technology of the 80's.
For the past year we have been studying an architectural concept we call
NETS (Network Error-Tolerant System} as a possible successor to the SIFT and
FTMP class of fault-tolerant systems. NETS consists of clusters, each of which
has a direct communication link with only a few other clusters; thus, as is standard
in computer networks, communication between non-neighbor clusters requires the
passing of data through intermediate clusters. Each cluster is intended to be
responsible for 1 (or possibly a few) task, and is likely to be located physically
close to external equipment (sensors, actuators, etc.) associated with the task. A
cluster might have internal redundancy to enable it to continue operation in the
presence of faults - in particular permanent or transient faults that only impact,
say, 1-2 processors. It is anticipated that each cluster will be a SIFT configuration
of 1-5 processors, 5 processors being required where higher reliability for a task is
mandated and 1 processor where the task is not critical.
An initial design and analysis of NETS has been completed. In the process
of carrying out the design, we identified a number of difficult problems, most
of which we have solved at least to the point of pragmatic, if not theoretically
optimal, solutions. NETS appears to address the deficiencies of SIFT and FTMP,
and to achieve the high level of reliability required for aircraft electronics systems.
It is recommended that consideration be given to carrying out a detailed design
of NETS, leading to a simulation and/or a prototype that could be evaluated in
AirLab.
Section 1.1 describes in more detail the goals of an aircraft fault-tolerant
system that motivated the design of NETS. The overview of the NETS architec-
ture is presented in Section 1.2, with emphasis on the intercluster communica-
tion protocols and the requirements of the various executive-level functions. Of
-- 3 --
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primary concern is failures in communication links: how to mask errors that follow
such failures, how to identify faulty links, and what communication protocols can
avoid the use of known faulty links. Formulas determining the reliability of NETS
under various redundancy and communication assumptions are derived in Section
1.3. Section 1.4 discusses desirable properties of the interconnection network.
One desirable feature is that, for a given fan-out d from each cluster and a given
diameter k (the diameter being the maximum number of hops between any pair
of clusters), the maximum number of clusters n should be accommodatable. This
turns out to be a "classical" problem in graph theory, called the (n_d_k) prob-
lem, studied extensively at SRI and elsewhere during the 60's. We summarize
the relevant results. This previous work, unfortunately, assumes no failures of
communication links. Our discussion derives some initial results on the effect of
faults on the diameter of certain networks. For the particular class of networks,
due to Akers, we show that the increase in diameter due to the need to avoid a
single faulty link occurring anywhere in the network never exceeds 2; even more
encouraging, for most networks in this class, there is no increase in diameter in
the presence of a single faulty link.
The graphs discussed in Section 1.5 guarantee the existence of a path, be-
tween any pair of clusters, whose length does not exceed d. Algorithms for iden-
tifying the shortest path, particularly following a failure in communication link,
are discussed in Section 1.5.
Each cluster, being a SIFT computer, will employ our previously developed
algorithm for achieving synchronization among the processors within a cluster.
Extensions to that algorithm to obtain network-wide synchronization are discussed
in Section 1.6.
Section 1.7 discusses the related problems of recovery from massive transients
and initialization of a newly connected cluster. It is shown that a cluster suffering
a transient failure that corrupts data in all of the cluster's computers can be
reinitialized through the efforts of the cluster's neighbors. Conditions for recovery
from simultaneous massive transients are also discussed. Section 1.8 presents
unresolved problems and suggests experiments that could be conducted on AirLab
-- 4 --
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to confirm our initial findings on NETS and to identify optimal ways of using
NETS in particular applications.
-5-
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1.1 Requirements of Advanced Fault-Tolerant Systems Addressed by
NETS
1.1.1 High Reliability
As assumed for SIFT, the probability of a critical computation yielding an
incorrect or late result is not to exceed 10-1°/hour over a 10 hour period. Given
the current reliability of processors (even those developed using VLSI technology),
this low probability of failure can be achieved only with redundancy. Under
certain simplifying assumptions, it is easily shown that for a given amount of
redundancy, the smaller the replaceable unit the higher the reliability. This
property is seen by considering a 5-fold replicated system ( e.g. a centralized SIFT
system). Assume the probability of failure of each processor is p, yielding a system
failure probability Pc = 5P4, for small values of p. This calculation assumes that
a fault in a processor is detected and the processor is logically removed from the
configuration prior to the occurrence of a subsequent fault. Thus system failure
occurs upon the 4th failure, at which time there remains one failed processor
and one working processor in the configuration. In contrast, consider a highly
partitioned system which consists of n SIFT systems, each of which is 5-fold
replicated, but where each of the SIFTS in this case performs -_th of the work
as compared with the original system to a first approximation we can assume
that the probability of failure of a processor is proportioned to its size; hence thep
failure probability of an individual processor is _. For this partitioned system,
the probability of failure Pp = 5n-4p 4, or Pc = n4Pp. Of course, this simple
calculation ignores the effect of any fixed, processor size-independent overhead
associated with executive routines. Assume an overhead portion that contributes
Po to the failure probability of a processor independent of the size of the processor
P ? Then, Pc (2-4)(n4)Pp.and also assume (very pessimistically) that po = n. =
tWith this latter assumption, half of the computation carried out by a partitioned system
processor is overhead.
-6-
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For all but very small values of n, then it is seen that there is significant gain in
reliability to be realized through partitioning.
1.1.2 Expandable and Contractible
In the current SIFT architecture, each processor has a direct connection to
every other processor through a broadcast link. This property limits the number
of SIFT processors in a given system to about 16 - giving a range of about 3:1
from a minimal system to a maximal system. A larger range - perhaps of the
order of 10:1 - would be desirable for a fault-tolerant computer to be useful for
the full range of NASA applications.
1.1.3 Capability of Using Different Processor Types
One attractive feature of a network-based system is the capability to accom-
modate different processor types within a given system. Among the processor types
could be special purpose processors (e.g., navigation computers, air data com-
puters, etc.) in addition to general purpose processors. SIFT and FTMP, requir-
ing tight synchronization among the processors, do not easily accommodate a wide
range of processor types, particularly if the clock rates are different. Moreover, the
overall reliability of the system can be improved by the use of different processor
types. Our reliability computations assume processor faults occur independently.
If faults are correlated, the actual reliability will be significantly lower than com-
puted. Independence of faults is more likely if the processors have different designs
and different manufacturers. Moreover, the use of different processor types will
make certain software faults (e.g., in the implementation of compilers} more in-
dependent and less likely to result in system failure.
1.1.4 Immunity to Massive Transient Faults
The current fault-tolerant systems cannot tolerate a transient fault such that
-7-
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values of data in a majority of the processors are modified. Such a fault could be
caused by a lightning strike or by power surge. Although not absolutely precluding
global damage from massive transient faults, the physical separation of processors
afforded by a network-based system should help localize the corruption caused by
such faults and provide the opportunity for recovery.
1.1.5 Ability to Interface to Distributed Smart Sensors and Actuators
The trend in aircraft electronics system design is to sensors and actuators
which are "smart", i.e., which provide on-site computational power. The current
SIFT system interfaces with such devices through conventional Input-Output
channels. A more attractive approach is to consider these devices as part of the
overall network, thus enabling the more effective use of their computational power.
As described in the following sections, the NETS architecture can satisfy all
of the above goals.
-8-
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1.2 Overview of NETS Architecture
This section presents a brief overview to the NETS architecture. Issues
covered are
• The organization of the architecture as a network of clusters, and possible
protocols for intercluster communication, including the accommodation to
faulty links
• The combination of clusters of different redundancy
• Requirements for an overall network executive that is distributed among
the nodes of NETS
1.2.1 Clusters and Their Communication Protocols
The computational unit in NETS is called a cluster, the clusters communicat-
ing with each other through a network. As illustrated in Figure 1, a cluster is a
site that can be associated with a sensor, an actuator, or can be a computation
cluster whose role is to generate outputs in response to inputs. A sensor cluster
will have no logical inputs, and an actuator cluster no logical outputs. A computa-
tion cluster will have both logical inputs and logical outputs. The interconnection
network need not be a complete graph; that is, each cluster need not have a direct
connection to every other cluster. Hence intermediate hops will be required when
a pair of nonadjacent clusters communicate with each other.
In generating the value to be delivered to an actuator in response to sensor
inputs, all three types of clusters could be involved. A chain of tasks (in general a
tree if it is assumed that more than one sensor is involved) cooperate to generate
the output, the sensors providing the inputs, the computation clusters generating
intermediate values, and the actuator generating the final value. In its most
general form, the graph of these clusters will be as indicated in Figure 2. The
sensors and actuator clusters are "stubs" hanging off a general graph (containing
-- 9 --
1. NETS: Network Error-Tolerant System 1.2. Overview of NETS Architecture
loops). The loops are present to account for one (or more) computation duster
executing more than one task in the chain of tasks.
...J()
()
S: SENSORCLUSTER
A: ACTUATORCLUSTER
C: COMPUTATION CLUSTER
FIGURE 1 NETS IS AN INCOMPLETE INTERCONNECTION OF CLUSTERS
/
FIGURE 2 THE GENERAL FORM OF THE CLUSTER GRAPH
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Each cluster is configured as a SIFT computer, i.e., a complete interconnec-
tion among a set of processors. It is expected that a given NETS system will have
clusters of different size; we call such a cluster an n-SIFT. We will represent the
internal structure of a n-SIFT as the schematic illustrated (for n=5) in Figure
3. It is likely that the maximum value of n needed for currently envisioned ap-
plications is 5, as the probability of failure of a 5-processor SIFT is quite low. Of
course as discussed below, for less critical tasks clusters containing fewer than 5
processors will suffice.
Figure 3. Within a NETS Cluster the Interconnection is Complete
Let us now consider the structure of the interconnection between a pair of
clusters. As illustrated in Figure 4 for the two 5-SIFTs, there is a single link
between corresponding processors; for the current discussion let us assume that the
link is bidirectional, although unidirectional links are possible. Assume that a task
a executing on cluster A is required to transmit data to a task b executing on B.
In the absence of failures, each A processor will send the data to its corresponding
B processor. When all of the B processors have received the data, they exchange
the received values and vote. What if a link suffers a failure? Since a link is just
a wire connecting a pair of processors, it is convenient to view a link failure as a
failure in either of its associated processors. Accordingly, an error resulting from
a link failure can be masked as long as there is adequate voting margin; what
- 11 -
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constitutes an adequate voting margin for link failures is discussed in the next
section. Furthermore, once the link failure is identified, that link can be avoided
in future communication between A and B. The identification and reporting of link
failures is quite straightforward, since it is simply the identification and reporting
of processor failures. Thus the link, say, (A-2, B-2) will be assumed to be faulty
under any of the following conditions:
1 1
5 2 5
Link 2-2 fails if A2 or B2 fail
Figure 4. Interconnection between two 5-SIFTs
1. The processors of cluster B (A) determine processor B-2 (A-2) to have
suffered a permanent fault through B-2 (A-2) being outvoted on some
computation.
2. B-2 (A-2) reports itself to be faulty to more than one of its neighbors in
B(A).
Note that in producing erroneous outputs B-2 (Ao2) could be faulty itself or
could have received erroneous data from its neighbor in the other cluster - A-2
or B-2. The safepolicy here is to assume both A-2 and B-2 are faulty. Note,
however, that a link could fail but the associated processors could still be capable
of performing other activities, e.g., compute on behalf of tasks or transmit data
- 12 -
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along other links (see below). Hence a policy less profligate in dismissing processors
would be as follows: If a processor (say, B-2) is outvoted on data received from
A, assume the failure could be either in A-2 or B-2 pending confirmation by
subsequent error reports. That is, if no reports are received indicating that A-2 is
unable to carry out its task processing activities, it is allowed to participate in all
activities of A except the transmittal of data to B. Alternatively, future reports
could indicate that B is likely to be working.
Once it has been determined, by either A or B, that a link is faulty, the
cluster noting the failure informs its neighbor that the link is to be avoided. The
direct exchange of failure information is possible if the links between processors are
bidirectional; otherwise, as discussed below, the information must be transmitted
through a path that contains other clusters.
The discussion above is concerned with the ease where cluster B contains a
task that requires data from its neighbor A. What if the destination of A's data is
to be a third cluster C which is not a neighbor of A? For example, the transmission
might require an intermediate hop through B. In this ease, the working processors
of A transmits the data to B using working links The working processors of B vote
on the received values and then transmit the voted values to C, again using working
links. For example, as illustrated in Figure 5, A would avoid the link (A-2,B-2)*
and B the link (B-3,C-3), assuming these links were known to be faulty. By
voting on the data received from A, B can mask any errors from newly failed
links between A and B, thus increasing the chances for transmittal of error-free
data to C. In addition, B can immediately take note of a failed link and inform A
of the failure. We call this approach the vote and forward protocol. Through this
protocol, errors are handled by the cooperation of the two processors connected
by the failed link; no other clusters need participate. The disadvantage of the
vote and forward protocol is the delay it introduces.
Assuming A-2 has failed so as to emitgarbage, B can ignoreit by B-2 (if working)not reporting
the value receivedfrom A-2 or by B-2's fellowclusters ignoring B-2.
- 13 -
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1
\/
/\
/ /
FIGURE 5 USE OF AN INTERMEDIATE HOP TO TRANSMIT DATA FROM A SOURCE
TO A DESTINATION
A different protocol, which involves less delay, is called the forward and vote
at destination protocol. Data received by an intermediate cluster is forwarded to
the next cluster on the path without voting. Once all of the replicas arrive at the
destination cluster, they are voted on. The successful masking of errors requires
that the paths taken by the different replicas be nonoverlapping, otherwise a single
link failure could cause correlated errors. A further complication is in locating
faulty links, as a single error report can only locate the error to a path which
might contain a number of links. It would be necessary to exercise, subsequently,
each of the suspected links to try to locate the faulty link.
- 14 -
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1.2.2 The Combining of Clusters of Different Redundancy
One of the goals for NETS that we indicated in Section 2 is the capability
to handle tasks of different criticality without enduring the penalty of excessive
redundancy for the less critical tasks. NETS can achieve this goal through the use
of clusters containing different numbers of processors. Highly critical tasks would
be assigned to clusters containing 5 processors; less critical tasks to 3-processor
clusters; uncritical tasks to 1-processor clusters.
If clusters containing different levels of redundancy are to be combined in a
single NETS, one approach is to segregate the clusters of a given redundancy to
their own subnetworks of NETS. However, it is possible to combine clusters of
different redundancy without compromising the reliability goals.
What are acceptable communication paths between clusters, particularly if
the paths might involve clusters whose redundancies are not the same? Let us
consider a source cluster A sending data to a destination cluster B through a
path containing other clusters. Assume that A and B have the same redundancy
n. If the forward and vote at destination protocol is used, the ideal is that the
number of distinct paths from source to destination be equal to n. The minimum
requirement is that at least 3 distinct paths be used to protect against any single
point failure.
If the vote and forward protocol is used, all clusters on the path should ideally
have the same redundancy as that of the source and destination clusters. Figure
6 summarizes the various possibilities.
One additional issue in combining clusters of different redundancy is balanc-
ing the load on each processor. That is, if m 3-SIFTS are to be neighbors of a
5-SIFT, what should the interconnection pattern be so that each of the processors
of the 5-SIFT have approximately the same fan-out? The solution is quite simple,
and is best illustrated through example.
- 15 -
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SIMPLEX REPLICATED
CLUSTER / CLUSTER
w w _ '_J v
(a) Acceptable Path
End nodes - simplex
Intermediate nodes - simplex or replicated
0 0 0 0 0
(b) Acceptable Path
All nodes replicated
0 0 • • 0
(c) Unacceptable Path
End nodes - replicated
Intermediate nodes - simplex or replicated
Figure 6. Communication Paths containing Simplex and Replicated Clusters
Assume that the number of external links to each of the 5-SIFT processors is
not to exceed 2. Then, as illustrated in Figure 7, three 3-SIFTS can be neighbors
of the 5-SIFT using the interconnection pattern indicated. Each of the processors
of the 5-SIFT, except 2, have a fan-out of 2. The interconnection pattern can be
described using a matrix notation, as below.
- 16 -
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Processors of 5-SIFT
3-SIFTs 1 2 3 4 5
A x x x
B x x x
C X X X
According to the matrix, the 3 processors of A are connected to processors 1,2,
and 3 of the 5-SIFT respectively, etc.
FIGURE 7 A BALANCED CONNECTION OF 3-SIFTs WITH A 5-SIFT
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In general, if the allowed fan-out from each of the 5-SIFT processors is d,
then the maximum number of 3-SIFTs that can be connected is given by the
quotient 5,_ Thus for d--3, the following matrix will apply.3 "
Processors of 5-SIFT
3-SIFTs 1 2 3 4 5
A x x x
B x x x
C x x x
D x x x
E x x x
Note that the data passed to a 5-SIFT from a 3-SIFT will be subjected to only
3-way voting.
1.2.3 Requirements of NETS Executives
It is envisioned that each of the clusters of NETS will run the SIFT executive:
local executive, error report, global executive, etc. To manage the network itself,
a network executive is required. The network executive functions, distributed
among the clusters, are the following:
• Apply the vote and forward protocol to messages destined for other clusters.
It is envisioned that each message will have a destination tag, and each cluster
will have a table indicating which neighbor to use for each possible ultimate
destination.
• Receive and process error reports from neighboring clusters. The processing
will identify faulty links, which are to be avoided in subsequent communica-
tions. The identity of a suspected faulty link is broadcast to the cluster at the
other end of the link.
- 18 -
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• Determine optimal paths to be used in the communication of data between
clusters, where optimal means shortest. As discussed in Section 1.5, this func-
tion will be invoked when enough links between a pair of clusters have failed,
thus precluding the reliable communication between these clusters. Many com-
munication paths might have to be changed. As we show, the determination
of new paths can be carried out locally in the sense that each cluster decides
on the new optimal paths from information received from its neighbors.
• Participate in the initialization of newly connected neighboring clusters and in
the recovery of neighbors that have suffered massive transients that temporary
disable a majority of the cluster's processors. The approach to both of these
problems is discussed in Section 1.6.
- 19 -
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1.3 Reliability Assessment
In this section we consider the reliability achievable by NETS. We consider
the following failure modes: (1) permanent faults - system failure due to exhaus-
tion of spares, and (2) permanent faults - system failure due to buildup of faults
beyond the voting margin before reconfiguration is completed. For each of the
modes we consider separately the cases of (a) cluster failure, preventing it from
performing tasks; and (b) link failures, preventing a cluster from communicating
with any of its neighbors.
It is shown that acceptable reliability - better than the basic requirement of
10-1°/hour for critical tasks - can be obtained, even for relatively large NETS
systems, assuming that (1) all critical tasks are executed on 5-SIFT clusters, (2)
all communication between critical tasks is through 5-SIFT clusters using the
vote and forward protocol, and (3) the fan-out from each cluster is at least 2. It
is encouraging to observe that the reliability requirement is achieved with such
a modest fan-out. Other requirements (e.g., keeping the communicating paths
short) will probably dictate a higher fan-out.
1.3.1 System Failure Due to Exhaustion of Spares
We consider a NETS system to be a network in which each node is a 5-SIFT.
(Clearly, we do not imply that all of the clusters must be 5-SIFTS; Our intention
is to derive a lower bound on the reliability that critical tasks would experience.)
Let us assume, for this section, that faults become detectable errors that are
handled very shortly after their occurrence. Thus a cluster will continue working
through its third failure, as two working processors remain. However, the next
fault spells the failure of the cluster, as one good and one bad processor would
remain. Thus the probability of 4 (out of 5) processor failures is approximately
5p4, where p is the probability of a cluster failure. (Again, we are assuming faults
occur independently of each other.) The probability of a failure of exactly one
cluster in an N-cluster system is then 5Np 4.
- 20 -
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Now let us consider the probability of system failure due to a sufficient
number of link failures occurring such that a cluster cannot communicate with
any of its neighbors. We will only be enumerating those failure conditions that
do not constitute cluster failure. Our initial assumptions will be as follows: (1)
fan-out of two from each cluster, and (2) the forward and vote protocol; later we
consider higher values of fan-out (which will provide improved reliability and the
forward and vote at destination protocol.
\
Figure 8. A pattern of Four Faults that does not cause Link Failure
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Figure 8 shows 3 clusters; we will consider the probability that a fault pattern
occurs that prevents A from communicating with either of its neighbors. A cluster
I will be unable to communicate directly with cluster J, if 4 (or more) of the links
connecting I and J are failed. Note that if 3 or fewer links have failed, the voting
margin suffices to allow reliable communication under the assumption that a faulty
link is ignored prior to the next occurrence of a faulty link. We first observe that
all patterns of 4 failures spread over these 3 clusters are tolerated. (The reader is
reminded that we are excluding from the enumeration those failure patterns that
cause cluster failure, e.g., the failure of 4 processors in A.) An example of a pattern
of 4 such tolerated failures is shown in Figure 8. The four failures indicated would
prevent A from communicating directly with B, as only one good link (A-5,B-5)
remains between these two clusters. However, 4 good links remain between A
and C, and 3 good links remain between B and C, thus allowing communication
between A and B to be through C. The other patterns of 4 faults among the 3
clusters are: two in each of two clusters, two in one cluster and one each in the
other two clusters - all of which can be shown to be tolerated.
Now let us consider the patterns of 5 failures that are not tolerated. We will
refer to Figure 9 for this discussion, where a pattern of 5 failures is distinguished.
Assume a state where the failures of A-l, A-2, A-3, and B-4 have occurred and been
noted. In this state A cannot communicate directly with B, but can communicate
with B using C as an intermediary; A would use the links (A-5,C-5) and (A-4,C-4)
in communicating with C. Now assume C-5 fails, but the failure is not detected.
Clearly C might receive differing value on the two links it has been using to
communicate with A, spelling possible failure of the system.
It can be shown that there is no pattern of five faults two of which are in A
such that A will not be able to communicate with either B or C. Hence the only case
of interest is three faults in a cluster, say A. If the two remaining faults are both in
the same cluster, then A will have two working links on which it can communicate
with the other cluster, thus avoiding isolation. Hence the enumeration need only
consider three faults in A, one fault in B (such that A cannot communicate with
B), and one fault in C (such that A cannot communicate with C). The number of
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such patterns is given by
C(5, 3)* C(2, 1)* C(2, 1)= 40.
Then, an upper bound on the probability of system failure due to link faults is
40Np 5. This is an upper since some of the patterns covered for a cluster will also
spell failure for a neighbor.
\
Figure 9. A Pattern of Five Failures that is not Tolerated
Note that for reasonably small values of p, the probability of system failure is
dominated by the probability of cluster failure. Further note that the probability
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of A not being able to talk with both of its neighbors is given by 100p 4 (enumerating
the patterns of four faults that cause either intercluster communication path to
become unreliable). Exceeding the probability of cluster failure by a factor of 20,
this is probably too high for critical computations. Thus it is necessary to allow
for alternate communication paths in NETS.
If the intercluster fan-out is increased to 3, the probability of system failure
due to link failure is decreased to 60Np _. It is probably not necessary to employ
a fan-out of 3 from the standpoint of achieving reliable communication.
Now let us consider the use of the forward and vote at destination protocol.
All that is required is that A have two or more working links - both to the same
neighbor or one one to each of its neighbors. In this case all patterns of 5 failures
are tolerated, but at the expense of the more complicated protocol.
1.3.2 System Failure due to Fault Buildup Prior to Reconfiguration
Unlike the adaptive voting approach assumed in the previous section, we are
assuming here that faults are not detected and handled. Thus system failure will
occur whenever three bad inputs are generated - either within a cluster carrying
out a computation or in the passing of data between clusters. The probability of
three faults in a 5-SIFT is given by 10pa.
On the other hand, the communication between a pair of clusters (A and B)
will become unreliable when A suffers 2 faults (say in Aj and Ai) and B suffers one
fault in B1, 1 ----j or i. The number of such fault patterns is
C(5, 2) * C(3, 1) -- 30.
Thus the probability of system failure due to cluster failure and that due to link
failures are comparable. Furthermore, there is no alternative to improving the
reliability in this case short of increasing the redundancy level of the clusters.
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1.4 Structure of the Interconnection Network
In this section we consider the interconnection network through which clusters
communicate with each other. One key property of the network is that it allow
clusters to communicate with each other with minimal delay. For the moment
let us assume that each cluster has the need to communicate with every other
cluster. (It is understood that this assumption ignores the possibility of assigning
collections of tasks that communicate with each to collections of clusters that are
close to each other; this possibility is discussed later.) Hence a measure of the
quality of a network is the diameter k of the network. Here diameter is taken in
the graph-theoretic sense to mean the following:
Let the distance between any pair of adjacent nodes be 1. Let
the distance between any pair of nonadjacent nodes i,j, be the
length lli of the shortest path between i and j. The diameter k
of the graph is the length of the longest shortest path, where the
maximum is taken over every pair of nodes. Thus for a diameter
k graph it is assured that no more than k hops need be taken in
going between any pair of nodes.
As might be expected, the diameter of a graph generally decreases with the
fan-out d permitted from each node. In the limit, if every node is connected to
every other node, the diameter is one. However, we are seeking graphs in which the
fan-out is much less than the number of nodes. In this case, a more comprehensive
measure of the quality of the graph is the number of nodes n, for a given d and
k, the general desire being to find graphs with maximum n. A graph having n
nodes, diameter k, and fan-out d is called an (n,d,k) graph. A graph having the
largest n for given d and k is called an (n,d,k)maz graph.
One further complication is the impact of faulty links. We want the diameter
to be low despite the occurrence of faulty links - say t such faults; whenever a
fault occurs it is necessary to find a new shortest path that does not include the
faulty link. A graph of n nodes, fan-out d, and diameter k in the presence of t or
fewer faulty links is called an (n,d,k,t) graph. Again, we are, in general, interested
- 25 -
1. NETS: Network Error-Tolerant System 1.4. Structure of the Interconnection Network
in maximizing n for fixed values of the other parameters - leading to (n,d,k,t)max
graphs.
First let us consider the fault-free case. As discussed by Elspas[11], it is
relatively easy to compute an upper bound on n for (n,d,k)max graphs; this bound
has become known as the Moore bound. Consider the maximum number of nodes
in a graph such that the distance from one distinguished node to any other node
is no more than k, assuming a fan-out of d. Let a be the root node of a tree.
Let there by d successors to a, as allowed by the fan-out limitation. Let each of
these successors have d-1 successors, again as constrained by the requirement of
fan-out of d. This construction can be continued to yield a tree of k levels below
the root; the distances from the root node to the leaves of the tree is k, and the
total number of nodes Nmaz is
Nmaz = 1 + d + d(d - 1) + d(d - 1)_ +-.. + d(d - 1)t¢-1
Simplification of this series yields
1 + d[(d- 1)k- 1]Nmaz = for d > 3d-2
This tree construction is seen to maximize the number of nodes such that the
distance between one node and the other nodes in the graph does not exceed k.
Of course, the construction does not guarantee that every pair of nodes is within
distance d -- hence the construction yields only an upper bound.
During the 60's, a number of researchers searched for (n,d,k) graphs, in
particular for families of such graphs with a large value of n, for particular values
of d, and k. Unfortunately, all of this work was aimed at the fault-free case.
Below we discuss several such families and show how the diameter is affected by a
single link failure occurring anywhere in the graph - the case t=l. As discussed
in the previous section, the occurrence of more than one link failure is so unlikely
that we need not consider it.
Let us consider a particularly interesting family of (n,d,k) graphs - - due to
Akers[10]. For this family the key parameters will be as follows:
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k--d-1
n --- C(2d - 1, d)
the fan-out for this class of graphs is relatively high, but at the benefit of relatively
low distance. The following table gives the key parameters of the Akers graph for
a few values of d, and compares n with the Moore bound.
d k n nma=
2 1 3 3
3 2 10 10
4 3 35 53
5 4 136 426
Although these graphs do not come close to satisfying the Moore bound
(except for small values of d), we will observe that the distance increases only
slightly (if at all) when link failures are taken into account.
01110
11001 10011
I011( 01101
FIGURE 10 AN AKERS (n, d, k) GRAPH
Akers' construction technique is as follows. There are C(2d-l,d) binary words
of length 2d-1 each of which have exactly d l's. Associate a node of the graph
with each of these words. For d -- 3, there are C(5,3) --- 10 such words of length
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5, each of which have exactly three l's. A branch is drawn between each pair of
nodes whose corresponding words have exactly one 1 in a common position. The
graph for d -- 3 is shown in Figure 10.
We claim that this construction yields a diameter of k = d-1 -- 2 for the
case d = 3. The proof by construction given by Akers, is as follows:
Consider any two nodes P1 and P2 that agree in q places and, hence, disagree
in r -- 2(d-l-q) places. It can be shown that r is even and q odd for all node
pairs. When r ( q, P1 and P2 are distance-r apart, limited by a sequence
of r branches found as follows. Take in turn each of the r disagreeing places
and complement the digits in the other 2d-2 places, assuring that the position
chosen to be unchanged at each step contains a 1. Similarly, when q ,_ r, PI
and P_ are distance-q apart. The process is to take each of the q agreeing
places and complement the other 2d-2 places, assuring again that the position
chosen to be unchanged contains a 1. The number of branches traversed is at
most d-1.
Below we illustrate the construction for two nodes of Figure 10, distance-2
apart.
Positions 1 2 3 4 5
PI 1 0 1 1 0
P2 1 1 1 0 0
We observe that q = 3 (positions 1,3,5) and C -- 2 (positions 2,4); hence we
follow the step associated with the conditions C ( q. We start with PI (although
the process would yield the same path if we started with P2), seeking the node Pi
that will define the path of length 2. By the rule above, position 4 of Pi is to be
left at 1; the other digits of Pi are complemented, yielding Pi = 01011.
Although the Akers' graphs were not necessarily designed in consideration
of fault-tolerance, they have attractive diameter properties in the presence of
single link failures - - and multiple failures. In particular, as proved below, the
diameters of the graphs in the presence of single link failures is as follows; for
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convenience the diameter for the case of no link failures is also shown:
d k,_f k,f n
(no failure) (single failure)
2 1 2 3
3 2 4 10
4 3 5 35
5 4 5 136
6 5 5 462
For those graphs where the nodal degree d is greater than or equal to 6, there
is no increase in diameter due to the presence of an arbitrary link failure.
The proof involves exhibiting a path that avoids any possible single link and
whose length does not exceed k6f. To carry out the proof, we require the following
property, which we name the alternate path property.
Alternate Path Property (APP): In the Akers' graph, if two nodes px and
P2 are at least distance-3 apart, then there are at least 2 disjoint distance-3
paths linking them.
The proof of the APP follows from the construction outlined above for the
fault-free case. If Pi and P2 are at least distance-3 apart and r<q, then there
are at least two l's in positions of Pl for which the positions of P2 contain O's.
Hence in finding there are 2 nodes, pi, pj, that are M neighbors of Pl and on the
shortest path between Px and P2. (Similarly, if q<r, there are at least two l's
in positions of Pl for which the positions of P2 contain l's.) The neighbor Pk of
Pi (or pj) next on the path to P2 is shown to be unique. Hence for the case of 2
nodes exactly distance-3 apart, there are exactly two shortest paths, and they are
disjoint.
It now follows that if Pl and P2 are at least distance-3 apart, an alternate
path can be found to any primary path that avoids any (failed) link and that has
the same distance as the primary path. What about the case of nodes that are
distance-1 or distance-2 apart.
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Let us first consider the case of Pl and P2 being distance-1 apart, by referring
to Figure ll(a). Assume the link between Pl and p2 has failed, necessitating the
location of an alternate path. Let Pl and Pk (k_l) be a neighbor of P2. Clearly,
pi and Pk are distance-3 apart. One of these paths, of course, involves Pl and P2,
while the other goes through two new nodes pt and Pro. Hence the alternate path
between Pl and P2 (Pl, Pi, pl, Pro, Pk, P2) has distance 5. Note that the graph of
Figure 10, having diameter-2, requires special consideration. Since the diameter
k----2, the neighbors of Pl and P2 (Pi and Pk) are distance-2 apart, yielding an
alternate path at distance-4.
Figure ll(b) considers the ease of a failure in a path at length 2. Here we
take a neighbor Pk at Pi, and indicate two distance-3 paths from pk to p-2, one
of which contains the original distance-2 path as a subpath. Again, the graph of
Figure 10 is a special case, yielding a path of distance-3 that is the alternative to
a path of distance 2.
Figure 12 summarizes these two cases.
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PI Pm
P1 P2
(a) DISTANCE-1 CASE
Pk PI Pm
Pl Pl P2
(b) DISTANCE-2 CASE
FIGURE 11 ALTERNATE PATHS IN AKERS GRAPH
01110
11001 _10011
Pe
1011( 01101
a b
LINK a-b IS FAULTY
1. ALTERNATE PATH BETWEEN a, b IS (a,c, d, e, b)
AND HAS LENGTH 4.
2. ALTERNATE PATH BETWEEN c, b IS (c, d, e, b)
AND HAS LENGTH 3.
FIGURE 12 AN AKERS GRAPH WITH A SINGLE LINK FAILURE
1.4 Real Time Identification of Shortest Path
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In this section we consider the problem of identifying shortest paths in a
network; in particular, we consider the question: should the shortest path be
precomputed and stored for all possible link failures or should it be dynamically
computed? In either case, we assume that once the shortest path has been
determined, each node Pl stores for each ultimate destination node P2 the neighbor
Pi of Pl that is on a shortest path from Pl to P2.
Let us first consider the possibility of pre-storing all of the shortest paths,
in consideration of all possible single-link failures. That is, at each node Pl a
set of triples _p_, Pi, pl_ is stored, indicating that the shortest path to P2 is
the presence of a fault in Pl is to involve pi's neighbor Pl. Once a link has been
determined to have failed, its identity is broadcast to all nodes in the network,
each of which then applies the appropriate triples. Since the number of such
triples at each node grows as the square of the number of nodes n in the network,
the storage can quickly become excessive. For n:100, there are 104 triples; for
n--200, there are 4.104.
Hence for large (n_75) networks, it is recommended that the shortest path be
recomputed subsequent to a link failure and prior to continuing normal operation.
This process is quite straightforward for the case at the Aker's graph, each cluster
participating in the determination of alternate paths as follows. Assume nodes pl
and P2 define a failed link and that this link is on a particular shortest path. If
there is an alternate path starting at p_ that avoids P2 and has the same length
as the primary path, then the alternate path is selected. The Akers construction
algorithm is used, in which case the alternate path from Pl will be selected only if
the distance from Pl to the destination is at least 3. Otherwise, it will be necessary"
to seek the alternate path starting from some node preceding Pl. In this case, Pl
reports to its predecessor that it should seek the alternate path.
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1.5 Synchronization in NETS
The successful operation of a SIFT cluster requires that its processors be
synchronized to within approximately 50 microseconds. Such synchronization is
necessary to prevent a processor from changing its rate of processing tasks to
the point where it is working on an iteration that is different from its neighbors,
and thus producing different results and destroying the exact match required for
voting.
In NETS, of course, each SIFT cluster would have to be internally synchronized
and that cluster must itself remain synchronized with other clusters, though pos-
sibly the permissible intercluster skew may be greater than the permissible in-
tracluster skew. If each cluster contains at least 4 processors and if the fan-out
from each cluster is 3, then the current SIFT synchronization algorithm can be
used by each cluster to synchronize itself with its neighbors.
It should be noted that the algorithm can also be used for clusters containing
fewer than 4 processors. In this ease, each processor will synchronize itself with
its neighbors within a cluster and in other clusters.
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1.6 Recovery from Massive Transients
We assume the occurrence of a fault that corrupts the state of every proces-
sor in a cluster, but does not cause damage to prevent its subsequent processing.
This kind of fault we call a massive transient fault. A cluster c suffering such a
fault may not be able to effect recovery without outside assistance. For example,
the information indicating working processors and, perhaps more fundamentally,
indicating the neighbors of c might be have been lost due to the fault. The fol-
lowing are requirements to permit the recovery of a cluster through the assistance
of its neighbors:
• Restart Box (rb)
• Checkpointing of global data
• Detection of Massive Transient
• Recovery process
We will require a modest-size special purpose circuit in each cluster, which
we call a restart box (rb). A rb will accept inputs from each of c's neighbors,
requesting c to return to a reset state. To prevent a neighbor, perhaps one
that itself has suffered a massive transient, from maliciously trying to restart its
neighbors, restart will only be carried out if at least 2 of c's neighbors send restart
signals. The immediate effect of being in the reset state is to execute the clock
synchronization algorithm and run an initialization program that will continue
recovery (see below).
Certain critical data of a cluster must be checkpointed. This includes the
identity of the working processors, the identity of neighbors (assuming such in-
formation is not hard-wired), the pairs and triples needed to communicate with
other clusters on shortest paths, and the identity of which links with neighbors are
working. Such information can be given to a neighbor each time it is updated. Not
required to be checkpointed would be task data (it is regenerated each iteration)
and task schedules (they are likely to be stored in microcode).
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When a cluster has suffered a massive transient it is assumed that its behavior
becomes erratic. This could involve the processors becoming unsynchronized, the
loss of data such that there is little agreement among the output values of the
cluster's processors, or the absence of any output data. Any of these events, when
observed by a neighbor, are evidence of a massive transient. In any event, a
cluster exhibiting such behavior cannot produce any useful work. It would also
be possible for a neighbor to submit test data and, based on the return, decide
that the cluster has suffered a massive transient.
The recovery of a cluster is as follows. It must be given all of the data it
previously checkpointed and be moved to a state where it starts to execute the
tasks on its schedule. The data will come from its neighbors, once the cluster
indicates that it is in its reset state. The final input from the neighbors will move
the cluster to the state where it commences doing useful work.
- 35 -
1. NETS: Network Error-Tolerant System 1.7. Remaining Problems and Recommendations
1.7 Remaining Problems and Recommendations
We believe that the work conducted to date demonstrates the feasibility of the
NETS concept for the aircraft environment. Some additional problems, solution
to which would optimize the NETS design are the following:
. Determination of Near-Optimal Interconnection Networks. Based on the work
carried out in the 60's, adequate <n,d,k> graphs are known. However, the
situation is not as encouraging when faults must be handled - the <n,d,k,t>
case. We have shown that the Akers' graphs have good fault-handling capabilities
- at least for the case of single link faults. It is recommended that other families
of graphs be sought. Moreover, reasonably tight upper bounds on n should be
determined to guide the search for such graphs.
• Assignment of Tasks to Clusters. The motivation for the search for <n,d,k,t>
graphs was that tasks could be assigned to clusters in an arbitrary manner,
hence the need for graphs with low diameter. However, it should be possible to
take advantage of the structure inherent in task communication to determine
optimal assignments of tasks to clusters. The problem is as follows. Assume
that the computations to be carried out are expressed as graphs, the nodes of
which are tasks and the edges indicate communication between tasks. For a set
of such computations, find an optimal embedding onto the underlying network
graph. It is not obvious just what constitutes optimality, but minimizing the
longest communication path seems to be a good choice. It is noted that this
problem is related to the VLSI placement problem, although our problem does
not have the rectilinear structure of the VLSI problem.
• Effects of Combinations of Failures. Our design effort so far has assumed that
faults are handled shortly after their occurrence. We have avoided considering
the recovery from multiple failures, e.g., a massive transient at the same time
as a link failure. Some effort should be given to this more general case.
It is recommended that work continue on NETS to further refine and optimize
its design. Furthermore, we recommend that experiments be conducted on the
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AirLab facility to verify some of our "conjectures" and to determine if some of
the remaining problems admit to experimental solutions. It should be relatively
easy to use AirLab VAX's to emulate NETS. Each VAX could be a cluster. The
interconnection network could be overlayed on the VAX local area net in an easy
way. Any direct connection of clusters A and B would involve the direct transfer
of data from A to B via the net. Where an intermediate hop is required, two
transmissions via the VAX net would be effected, and so on. Among the important
properties to be monitored are the following:
• Transport delay
• Communication load, searching for any imbalances among the links
• Time for recovery from massive transients
• Time to compute shortest paths following identification of link failures
• Ability of the system to handle multiple errors.
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The Analysis of Transient Faults
Introduction
Faults in computer systems are of two kinds, solid and transient. A solid
fault is one in which some component of the system fails and will continue to
fail for all subsequent uses. A transient fault is one in which some component of
the system is temporarily deranged and fails in use, but in which that component
subsequently recovers, without repair action, and in subsequent use the component
does not fail.
Transient faults may be caused by thermal noise in a marginal component,
by cosmic rays or alpha rays, or by electromagnetic interference. For typical
transient faults, the faulty component is deranged for only microseconds or at
most milliseconds, though the errors resulting from the fault may persist for
much longer. It is difficult to obtain dependable information on the frequency
of transient faults under operational conditions, because current systems are
not instrumented to distinguish between solid and transient faults. However
such information as is available indicated that transient faults will occur more
frequently than solid faults, at perhaps ten times the rate.
2. The Analysis of Transient Faults Introduction
It is important to distinguish between solid and transient faults, since proces-
sors suffering from a solid fault are removed from the system configuration. In
contrast, processors subject to a transient fault are permitted to remain in the
configuration. In other designs, the initial action taken for both solid and transient
faults is the same - the processor is temporarily removed from the configuration
pending tests to determine whether it is working and can be readmitted. This
approach is not used in SIFT because:
• Processors diagnosed as having a solid fault are never readmitted to the config-
uration after they have been removed, even if the off-line diagnostic tests cannot
detect any fault. The coverage of the diagnostic tests is not high enough to
ensure that the benefit from readmitting good processors to the configuration
outweighs the loss in reliability from readmitting defective processors.
• Processors diagnosed as suffering from a transient fault are not removed from
the configuration, even temporarily, since the short duration of transient faults
ensures that the actual faulty condition will not last even as long as the time
required for error recognition and reconfiguration.
The reliability modelling results of the SIFT project [1] analysed the ability
to distinguish between solid and transient faults. Assuming that transient faults
are substantially more frequent than solid faults, it is important for the error
diagnosis of the system to be able to recognize transient faults.
• If transient faults are incorrectly diagnosed as solid, resulting in working proces-
sors being deleted from the system configuration, the rate of system failure due
to exhaustion of spares is greatly increased.
• If a solid fault is incorrectly diagnosed as a transient, the effects on system
reliability are much less deleterious. The solid fault will generate further errors
and provide further opportunities for repeating the diagnosis and recognizing
the solid nature of the fault. The system is at risk to the occurrence of a second
fault, whether transient or solid, during the time interval before the fault is
correctly diagnosed.
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Figure 12 contains results obtained from the reliability model for SIFT,
showing the probability of system failure within a 10 hour flight*. It is evident,
particularly where critical functions are protected by five-fold voting (f----5), that
a relatively small probability of regarding a transient fault as solid has a much
bigger effect on the probability of system failure than does the corresponding
probability of regarding a solid fault as transient. But, of course, it is essential to
recognize solid faults; regarding all solid faults as transient is devastating to the
reliability of the system.
Consequently, the ability of the system's error diagnosis routines to distin-
guish between solid and transient faults is very important.
2.1 Solid Fault Types
Many solid faults are catastrophic and either prevent the computer from
generating any results at all or cause almost all results generated to be erroneous.
However some faults, though solid, produce erroneous results only in rather specific
circumstances. Such faults generate periodic errors, produced more or less fre-
quently whenever those specific circumstances occur. A solid fault that generates
errors only infrequently can be difficult to distinguish from a succession of tran-
sient faults.
Some faults will never yield an erroneous result, for the particular com-
ponents are never actually used to produce the results in question. Other faults
yield errors, not on every execution of the task, but only for specific data values,
resulting in errors every few milliseconds, or seconds, or minutes. Experiments
have been performed at NASA Langley Research Center to investigate the propor-
tion of solid faults that do not generate immediate errors in the results of ap-
It is important to note that these results are based on plausible but arbitrary component failure
rates. Consequently the results can only be of qualitative significance. Quantitative measures
of the reliability must be derived from careful measurement of actual component failure rates
under operational conditions.
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plication programs. Unfortunately these experiments have, for obvious economic
reasons, considered only the proportion of faults that result, or do not result, in
an error within a relatively short time interval. It is important to extend this work
to determine the shape of the tail of the error-generation-frequency distribution,
and it is to be hoped that the team at NASA Langley might consider such an
experiment for AIRLAB.
During the period between the time when a solid fault occurs and the time
when the fault causes an error, the fault is "latent". Latent faults are of course
undetectable. The duration of latency of the fault is not significant, and latent
faults are no more damaging to system reliability than simple faults, provided
that the fault is "uncorrelated". While the latent fault remains undetectable so
long as it is latent, it can also do no damage so long as it is latent. Only when
the fault generates an error is there any risk to the system, and the duration
of the previous period of latency is of no significance, provided that the error is
generated at a random moment in time.
Correlated latent errors present a significant risk to the reliability of the
system. A correlated latent error remains latent until some other error also occurs,
and thus is manifested only in a double error situation. There are two ways in
which this can occur:
• The latent fault can be such that the only circumstances in which errors
are generated are those in which other errors are already present. Such a
fault might damage only the operation of the error detection, diagnosis, or
reconfiguration.
• The latent fault can be such that errors are generated only during a specific
infrequently performed, but critical, function (for instance the autolanding
functions). There is a risk that two processors might each be affected by such
a latent fault, undetectable until the function is invoked and then yielding a
double error.
This analysis, and indeed the whole SIFT design, does not address correlated
faults.
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There can also exist faults that are solid in that their defect is due to a
physical cause that is permanent, but which generate errors only infrequently due
to some physical aspect of the nature of the fault, rather than due to the nature of
the processing being performed. Such faults are referred to as "intermittent" and
are sometimes caused by cracks in conductors or by loose particles in packages.
An intermittent fault resembles a succession of transient faults. The duration of
each error generating event of an intermittent fault is usually rather longer than
for a transient fault, and the frequency of such event is usually much greater than
the frequency of transient faults in a properly working processor. The reliability
analysis for SIFT indicated that the transient fault analysis algorithms are well
able to protect the system against intermittent faults.
2.2 Error Generation and Detection
Faults, whether solid or transient, are manifested only through the errors
that they generate, whether those errors are in the results of the application tasks
or errors in the results of a diagnostic test sequence. This immediate error is of
course only an incorrect result. To act on the error requires that it be detected,
that a checking mechanism be capable of recognizing that the result is indeed
incorrect and thus that an error, and by implication a fault, exists. Once the
error is detected, it must be diagnosed that a specific type of fault is the cause of
the error, and that some recovery or reconfiguration action is appropriate.
In typical low reliability systems, error detection is very poor and the degree
of confidence that any particular erroneous result will be noticed is low. High
reliability systems, such as SIFT, in contrast have very good error detection and
almost any error will be detected.
Even though a fault may cause errors to be generated 'immediately', the
errors are not detected, and thus the existence of the fault is not recognized, until
the erroneous results are subjected to the voting or other error detection checks.
The results of high priority tasks are needed for use by other tasks within a short
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period of time, and thus must be voted or checked very promptly, certainly within
a few milliseconds. Thus, a fault that causes errors in the results of high priority
tasks can be detected soon after the fault occurs.
However, many systems contain background tasks whose results are not
needed immediately. The execution of such tasks may be spread over several
seconds, or even longer, and the results may not be voted until some convenient
moment long after they were generated. A fault that yields and error in the results
of a background task may not be detected until seconds, or even minutes, after
the fault occurs.
This has two effects:
• During the interval between the generation of the erroneous result for the
background task and the masking of that error by voting, the system is vul-
nerable to the occurrence of a second fault. Fortunately, background tasks
are usually not very critical and a rather higher risk of failure of such a task
can be accepted. Results that are very critical must be voted at frequent in-
tervals to ensure that errors are masked promptly, thus reducing the risk of
error accumulation between masking. This frequent voting of critical results is
necessary even if processing of those results is required only infrequently.
• A single transient error may occur and damage the results of several tasks. The
erroneous results of high priority tasks will be detected quickly, but further
error reports will continue to be generated for some time as other results of
lower priority are voted. This might confuse the error diagnosis routines into
thinking that the error that has occurred is persisting in generating errors,
and thus may be solid. It might also confuse the error diagnosis routines into
thinking that multiple faults had occurred.
It might be hoped that the nature or appearance of the error detected might
provide an indication as to the location and type of the fault that caused it.
Unfortunately, the errors detected are often of the form of an incorrect result
and it is difficult to ascribe a cause from such meager information. Further,
a "malicious" fault may masquerade as some different type of fault. It is es-
- 44 -
2. The Analysis of Transient Faults 2.3. The Analysis of Error Reports
sential that such deception should not permit the successive removal from the
configuration of working equipment until system failure results.
Any one error report originates at a single point in the system and the
report must be replicated for analysis by the necessarily replicated global executive
routines. As for any other information that originates at a single point, interactive
consistency or interactive convergence techniques must be used to ensure that
the replications are consistent. Even when a component reports itself to be
faulty, it is essential to use interactive consistency techniques to detect that
a processor has reported itself faulty to one neighbour and not to others, and
situation indistinguishable from that in which the neighbour falsely claims that
the processor has reported itself faulty.
2.3 The Analysis of Error Reports
An error report is certain information that a fault has occurred, but less
certain as to what fault and when. If interactive consistency techniques are used,
a report by processor A of an error in the results of processor B for iteration i of
task k provides the information that:
. the fault existed in either processor A, or processor B, or the link between them
• the fault existed at some time since the start of the data-window for iteration
i of task k
The global executive routines must make use of the combination of many
error reports to deduce the true nature of the underlying fault. The basic algo-
rithms used in SIFT are described in [1]. We discuss here three aspects of fault
diagnosis:
• identification of, and action on, link failure,
• identification of transient faults,
• identification of low error rate solid faults.
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2.3.1 Identification of Link Failure
When a processor fails, it will probably generate erroneous results and broad-
cast them to all of the other processors, resulting in a large number of error reports
from which it is easy to diagnose which processor has failed.
Less probably, a processor might suffer from a fault that causes it to generate
erroneous error reports even though the results being voted were correct. If that
processor is detected by the global executive to be generating many error reports,
claiming errors in several other processors, all unsupported by reports from other
processors, the diagnosis is again relatively easy.
But failure of the link between two processors results in error reports in
which one processor systematically reports errors in the results of just one other
processor, without any corroboration from other processors. The exact location
of the fault may be:
• in the physical link itself,
• in the transmitting circuitry of the broadcasting processor, after the point at
which the common broadcast signal has fanned out into separate signals for
each destination,
• in the receiving circuitry, or the result buffering, or the voting software, or the
error reporting software, of the processor reporting the error.
Because continued operation of SIFT requires full connectivity between all
processors of the configuration, and because continued operation with a faulty
link exposes the system to failure should another fault occur, it is essential to
reconfigure the system to a reduced configuration in which the faulty link is not
required, i.e. to a configuration without one or other of the two processors at
either end of the link.
If the fault is simple, it matters little which of the two processors is to be
reconfigured out of the system. But it is very important that a malicious fault
should not be able to exploit the choice to remove systematically a succession of
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other processors.
The algorithm recommended is:
following a link failure event in which processor B reports errors in the results of
processor A, without corroboration,
• if processor A is not on probation then:
• processor B is removed from the configuration,
• processor A is recorded as being on probation,
• if processor A is on probation then processor A is removed from the configuration.
The choice is made to favor removing processor B, rather than processor A,
from the configuration because there is very little logic in processor A after the
fanout point at which the common broadcast signal is split into separate signals for
each destination. Consequently is is relatively improbable, though not impossible,
for a malicious fault to develop in that small amount of logic within processor A.
In contrast, the amount of logic, both hardware and software, in processor B that
is capable of producing the symptoms is quite large.
However, the algorithm must guard against the possibility of a malicious fault
in the small amount of logic in processor A. Consequently, processor A is placed
on probation. Thus, if a malicious fault in processor A should succeed in causing
processor B to be removed from the configuration, any subsequent attempt by
processor A to repeat the attempt, say on processor C, results in the removal of A
rather than C. Consequently, the rather improbable malicious fault in processor
A can cause two processors to be lost, but no more than two.
2,3.2 Identification of Transient Faults
The identification of transient faults is based on their short duration. It
is assumed that a fault is solid if it persists, i.e. continues to generate errors,
for more than some period of time (known as the solid/transient discrimination
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interval). Typically that period of time might be set to say 200ms or 300ms, for
almost all transient events are much shorter. Faults that generate only single
isolated errors, or short bursts of errors, are assumed to be transient.
In systems in which all tasks operate at iteration rates shorter than the
solid/transient discrimination interval, such as SIFT Mk I, it is relatively easy to
distinguish solid from transient faults. Such system detect all errors within one
iteration, and any fault that causes errors to be detected in two or more iterations
can be assumed to be solid.
Future systems will contain tasks that operate at very different iteration
rates, and some of those iteration rates will be much longer than the solid/transient
discrimination interval. The detection of errors in the results of slowly iterating
tasks may be delayed for a period comparable to the iteration interval of the
task. For certain navigation and fuel management tasks, this delay may be many
seconds or even minutes. Thus, even for a transient fault of short duration, if
the results of lower priority tasks have been affected then error reports may be
generated periodically over a relatively long interval of time. Consequently it does
not suffice to assume that a solid fault is indicated by error reports spread over
an interval longer than the solid/transient discrimination interval.
The proposed algorithm is based on the concept of fault windows, the interval
of time somewhere within which a fault must have existed to cause the observed
error symptoms. We will consider two types of fault windows:
• error report windows,
• fault event windows.
An error report window is the interval within which a fault must have existed
to result in the observed error report. The error report window, for an erroneous
result from task A, extends from the earliest time of voting of any input value to
task A until the completion of interactive consistency on the error report.
A fault event window is the interval within which a fault must have existed to
cause several error reports, and thus is the intersection of the of the error report
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windows for each of the error reports.
The proposed algorithm for discrimination between solid and transient faults
is:
• initially the fault event window is set to empty.
• when a fault report is received,
• the error report window for that report is computed,
• if the fault event window is empty then an new fault event window is created
equal to the current error report window,
• if the fault event window is not empty, but the intersection between the
fault event window and the error report window is empty, then again a new
fault even window is created equal to the current error report window,
• if the intersection of the fault event window and the error report window is
not empty, the fault event window is set to that intersection.
• if the end of the fault event window is so long ago that no current fault could
generate an error report window to intersect it, the fault event window can be
set to empty.
• every time that a new fault event window is created, analysis is made of
the frequency of fault event to determine whether reconfiguration action is
required.
The behavior of this algorithm is illustrated in Figures 13 - 16. In Figure
13, the fault event window is initially empty. Thus the error report window is
computed and a new fault event window is created and set equal to the error
report window.
In Figure 14, a further error report has been received whose window overlaps
the fault event window. We assume that the same fault generated both error
reports. Thus the fault event window is reduced in size to the intersection of the
two windows. In Figure 15, it is still possible that the same fault caused all three
errors and thus the fault event window is again reduced in size.
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FEW: empty
E.W: I I
FEW: new I [
Figure 14. An Error is Reported when the Fault Event Window is Empty
FEW: I I
ERW: I I
FEW: I I
Figure 15. An Error whose Window overlaps the Fault Event Window
FEW: I I
ERW:- I I
FEW: H
Figure 16. A further Error whose Window overlaps the Fault Event Window
FEW: H
ERW: I I
FEW: new I I
Figure i7. An Error whose Window does not Intersect the Fault Event Window
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But in Figure 16, the next error report window no longer intersects the fault
event window, and it is not possible for a single transient fault of short duration
to have caused all of the errors that have been reported. Thus we create a new
fault event window, equal to the error report window, and start the analysis to
determine whether the frequency of faults requires reconfiguration (see the section
below).
2.3.3 Identification of Low Error Rate Solid Faults
The discrimination between solid and transient faults depends on the obser-
vation that a transient fault is of short duration, and thus on the assumption that
a set of errors, generated in some short interval and not followed by other errors,
have probably been generated by a transient fault. But some solid faults are such
that only occasional results are damaged by their presence. The equipment is
definitely broken, but the nature of the fault is such that many correct results
can be generated and only a few are erroneous. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that
in service it will be possible to diagnose faults sufficiently to distinguish solid faults
that generate errors only occasionally from transient faults. Consequently we do
not distinguish between transient faults and low rate solid faults, but rather aim
to determine whether the rate of occurrence of such faults is such as to damage
the overall system's reliability.
If a processor suffers from a solid fault (or a transient fault) generates er-
rors only occasionally, we must consider whether retaining that processor in the
configuration improves the reliability of the system or reduces it. Occasional
erroneous results from the processor, can be masked by the voting algorithms,
but retaining the processor in the configuration increases the risk that its er-
roneous result will coincide with some other erroneous result, causing system
failure. Removing the processor from the configuration eliminates the risk of
coincident errors, but increases the risk of exhaustion of spares should several
other processors fail.
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A preliminary analysis of this problem was performed using the reliability
model for SIFT. It is important to note that the results here are only indicative,
and that the modelling should be repeated with more accurate data. The model
was used to compare the reliability of two SIFT configurations:
• A five processor SIFT, with four normal processors and one processor set to
generate occasional (transient) errors,
• A four processor SIFT, with all normal processors.
A normal SIFT processor was assumed to have a solid fault rate of 2 X
10-4/hour and a transient fault rate of 2 × 10-a/hour. The error rate of the
'special' processor was varied to investigate the effects of a higher than normal
transient event rate.
For a SIFT system in which only three way voting is performed on critical
functions, it was found that the 4 processor system became more reliable if the
transient rate of the 'special' processor exceeded 10-I/hour. In effect, a processor
that suffers even a single fault per fight damages the reliability of the system, a
rate that is only slightly greater than the expected transient rate for normal SIFT
processors.
For a SIFT system in which critical functions are five way voted, it was
found that the 5 processor system, containing the 'special' processor, remained
more reliable even for special transient rates as high as one per few seconds.
When ample error masking was available, the risk of coincident errors was not
significant.
This investigation should be extended. For instance, no investigation was
made of the effect of remaining mission duration of the discrimination, nor was
consideration given to situations in which more than one processor has a high
transient fault rate. The analysis should also be performed for systems with initial
numbers of processors other than 5.
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Chapter 3
Novel Fault-Tolerant Architectures
Introduction
This task involved the study of novel, unconventional architectures from the
point of view of fault-tolerance. In particular, the relevance of dataflow architec-
ture was studied. The main conclusion reached was that fault-tolerance can be
added to a dataflow architecture more simply and for less cost than it can be
added to a conventional Von Neumann, imperative, sequential architecture. In
fact, it is worthwhile implementing conventional programs in a dataflow manner,
in order to then add fault-tolerance capabilities. Since in this case the use of
dataflow is not motivated, as it usually is, by a desire to use parallel computation
to lower program execution times, it is not out of the question to consider trans-
lating conventional programs into a dataflow language (compilation), or interpret-
ing conventional programs using an interpreter written in a dataflow language.
In either case the fault-tolerance capabilities could be added in the way to be
described in this report. Nevertheless, if the programs were actually written in
a dataflow language, using a dataflow machine would give decreases in execution
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time (increased efficiency) that would more than compensate for the increased
resources (extra processors) that are needed for fault-tolerance.
In order to simplify the later discussion, and clarify the meanings of terms
to be used later, it is essential to give a short introduction to the concepts of
dataflow.
3.1 Dataflow
It is useful to distinguish between two different ways of looking at dataflow_
One way is to consider dataflow as a programming methodology. The other is to
consider dataflow as a way of using multiprocessor machines. The use of dataflow
as a programming methodology has been around for some time and has been very
successful in applications like data processing (see, for example, the Transform
Analysis of Yourdon and Constantine, even though the final programs produced
tend to be in FORTRAN or COBOL and run on conventional machines. (This
is not a requirement of the methodology. In fact, the transition from dataflow
to conventional programs is currently just a tedious, error-prone, but necessary,
final stage in the methodology. When dataflow machines become available, it will,
presumably, be dropped.) Here dataflow will be considered at a more detailed
level, in terms of dataflow networks and the implementation of such networks by
dataflow machines.
The basic idea in dataflow is that computations proceed not by flow of control
around a flowchart but by flow of data around a dataflow network. A dataflow
network is a directed graph whose nodes represent operations or (user-defined)
functions to be performed on the data that come to the node along the edges
that terminate at the nodes. If the operation has several arguments, there should
be that number of edges terminating at the node, one per argument. The data
resulting from an operation leave the node along the single edge that originates
at the node.
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There are three non-operation nodes. One such node is the split node with
one incoming edge and an arbitrary number of outgoing edges, which simply splits
its incoming data items into several copies, sending one on each of the outgoing
edges. (Actually it is sufficient to only have split nodes with two outgoing edges,
and cascade them to get more than two copies.) There is also a merging node,
in which several edges converge on a single node, but do not correspond to the
different arguments of a polyadic operation. This is the select node, which has
three incoming edges, along one of which boolean data items will arrive at the
node, and on the basis of which the items arriving along the other two edges are
merged together into the stream of values that leave the node along its single
outgoing edge. There is also the distribute or switch node, the inverse of the
select node, having two incoming edges, one of which is for boolean data, and two
outgoing edges. The boolean input determines along which of the two outputs the
other input is to be sent.
There are several existing projects to build or design datafiow machines, but
they all differ in their approach to how dataflow network computations proceed.
(All of them agree, however, that computation should proceed in parallel, with
various operations being performed at the same time, asynchronously.)
3.1.1 Data-Driven vs. Demand-Driven Computation
There are different views as to the way computations are driven. Most
projects adopt the data-driven approach, which says that the operation of a node
will be performed as soon as there is a data item on each of the incoming edges of
the node. (In fact, most researchers assume that this is the distinguishing feature
of dataflow, whereas we feel that the term "dataflow" encompasses more than
this.) On the other hand, the demand-driven approach says that the operation
of a node will be performed only if, as before, there are data items on all the
incoming edges and, in addition, there is a demand for the result of the operation.
If there is a demand but there is an incoming edge of the node that does not have
a data item on it, then a demand for a data item is made of the node at the
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beginning of that edge. When, as a result of such demands, there is a data item
on each incoming edge, the operation of the node is performed (consuming the
inputs), and its result is sent out along the node's output edge.
The demand-driven approach is out of favor for two reasons. Firstly, just in
propagation of demands, there is extra computation that needs to be performed
before any operations actually get executed. Secondly, it seems that the amount
of parallel activity is less than would be produced by the data-driven approach,
because operations are only executed after it has been determined that their results
are definitely needed. It appears that there must be a sequential ebb and flow effect.
Demands are propagated, from the edges leading out of the network, back through
the dataflow network until they reach the nodes representing constants (nullary
operations) or edges leading into the network from outside (along which inputs
arrive). This is followed by a wave of computed values that go roaring forwards
through the network until data items finally come out along the edges that lead
out of the network. This is then followed by another wave of demands in the
backwards direction (resulting from demands for the next output values), and so
on. This means that the operations that eventually lead to an output value cannot
be performed until all the computations that will lead to the previous output
value have been completed. This contrasts sharply with data-driven computation,
where these different computations can be proceeding simultaneously, in different
parts of the network.
This ebb and flow effect is actually caused by not demanding an output until
the previous output has been produced, and would disappear if demands for output
were made spontaneously, that is, if computations were made to result from an
endless stream of demands for output being "initially" injected into the network.
The rate at which these demands for output are injected into the network could be
crucial in terms of getting as much parallelism from the demand-driven approach
as can be obtained from the data-driven approach.
In any case, it is not really obvious that the demand-driven approach is less
efficient. The computational savings to be made, by only performing computations
that are definitely necessary, may, when the number of processors is bounded
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(as of course it will be in practice), result in lower execution times for demand-
driven computation than for data-driven computation. There are other reasons for
using the demand-driven approach. For example, the implementation of certain
languages seems to require it, and the computational behavior is more predictable,
possibly allowing the use of dataflow in real-time applications.
3.1.2 Pipelined Dataflow vs. Tagged Dataflow
There is another way in which the various datafiow machine projects differ.
Some use pipelined (static) dataflow and some use tagged (dynamic) dataflow.
In pipelined datafiow, the edges in a datafiow network are considered to be
pipes along which data items fow, in a first-in, first-out manner; in other words,
there are queues acting as buffers between the nodes (some projects require these
queues to be of bounded length).
In tagged dataflow, the edges in a dataflow network simply indicate the routes
that data items must take. The buffers between the nodes are not queues, they
are unordered sets. Some discipline must be imposed on the order in which the
operation of a node takes the data items from the incoming edges, and this is
achieved by associating the data items with tags, so that the operation looks for
data items with appropriate tags. Often the tag simply indicates the order in
which the data items are added to the set. If the operation then can only take
data items from the set in increasing order of tag, and the data items produced
have the same tag as the data items consumed, tagged dataflow simply simulates
pipelined datafiow. On the other hand, if we allow the operation to be applied
simultaneously to many data items, and the operation terminates sooner for some
inputs than others, the tag will no longer correspond to the order in which the data
items are added to a set (we have assumed that the tags on data items produced
are the same as those on the data items consumed, and the time of production is
unpredictable). There are definite reasons for wishing to allow such simultaneous
application of operations (for example, to get increased parallelism, if dataflow
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is being used as a way of getting increased computational power), so we must
abandon the idea that the tag indicates the order in which items are added to
a set. Rather, the tag indicates the position of the data item in the conceptual
sequence of items emitted by a node. Thus it is still useful to think of sequences
of data items, but we needn't think that a node must consume the data items in
order, or produce them in order.
Tagged datafiow was invented to allow increased parallelism, but it has
many other useful applications, particularly in the dataflow implementation of
higher-level languages. For example, demand-driven tagged datafiow allows an
elegant way of dealing with conditional evaluation. After all, if-then-else is just
a ternary basic operation, which happens to be nonstrict, and such operations
are automatically handled when using demand-driven tagged dataflow. If the i-th
value of if P then A else B fi is demanded, then a demand is generated for the i-th
value of P. If the value produced is true, then a demand is generated for the i-th
value of A; if the value produced is false then a demand is generated for the i-th
value of B. In either case, the value subsequently generated is the desired i-th value
of the expression. The conventional, data-driven way of dealing with conditional
evaluation involves the use of distribute and select nodes. (In fact, select nodes are
not needed with tagged dataflow, because the tags do the appropriate selection.)
This is one of the few uses for such nodes. The other main use of distribute nodes
is to extract the final values from a loop.
3.1.3 User-Defined Functions
It is possible to let some nodes in a dataflow network represent user-defined
functions rather than operations. The definitions of user-defined functions can be
thought of as pieces of datafiow network. How these pieces of network are used
depends on whether the network is being evaluated in demand-driven or data-
driven mode. If it is data-driven, when data items first arrive at all the edges
leading into a function node, the node itself is replaced by the piece of network
that corresponds to the function definition (this piece of network must have the
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appropriate number of incoming edges to match the number of arguments of the
defined function, and a single outgoing edge), and the data items (the arguments
of the function) move on, into the new piece of network (the body of the function
definition). (This corresponds to call-by-value parameter passing- the arguments
of the function are evaluated before the function is called.)
If it is demand-driven, when a value of the function is first demanded, the
node is replaced by the defining piece of network and the demand travels up along
its single outgoing edge. Eventually this demand will result in demands being
sent out along the incoming edges of the piece of network, to get the arguments
of the function-call. (This corresponds to call-by-need parameter passing - the
arguments of the function are only evaluated when needed.)
Recursively defined functions naturally give rise to networks that grow larger
and larger, as more and more recursive calls are made. This changing of the
network is essentially "graph reduction".
The above explanation really only applies to pipelined dataflow. In tagged
dataflow, the network doesn't actually grow, but rather the tags on data items
get more complicated. For example, the tag for a particular data item that
corresponds to a local variable or formal parameter of a function call would
indicate that the call was reached by some particular calling sequence, i.e. by
a particular sequence of places in the program where function calls were made
that eventually led to the current function call.
3.2 Dataflow Machines
A dataflow machine is an actual piece of hardware that "runs" dataflow
networks. We have talked of the various approaches to network evaluation, and
mentioned that evaluation proceeds in parallel, asynchronously. All this activity
could be simulated on a single-processor machine, if we were using dataflow
simply as a programming methodology. A true dataflow machine, however, should
actually employ asynchronous parallel computation, using many processors, and
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be a real "supercomputer". The independence of the computational activities of
the various parts of a datafiow network, produced mainly by the lack of side effects
of the operations, means that such datafiow machines are actually feasible.
As previously mentioned, there are several projects that are currently con-
structing datafiow machines. They are all experimenting with different architec-
tures, mainly because of the different approaches to evaluation of networks: pipe-
lined datafiow versus tagged datafiow, data-driven versus demand-driven, and
bounded queues versus unbounded queues. The designers of the machines were left
with the problem of programming them; because it was clear that the programs
could not be actual networks, some linear textual representation was needed. The
languages they came up with tended to be conventional functional languages or
single-assignment languages, with the addition of some sort of iteration construct.
There is one datafiow language that is different from the others, called Lucid. The
other languages do not have the idea of infinite sequences built into the semantics
of the language, as Lucid does, and are therefore less intimately linked with a
main idea of datafiow, the idea of continually processing unbounded streams of
input data. Although it is not essential to use Lucid to get the benefits of fault-
tolerant dataflow, the language has some features that make it attractive, in its
own right, for the sort of applications that underlie this project, namely aircraft
flight control. This language makes certain requirements on dataflow implemen-
tations, namely that the datafiow be tagged and demand-driven. We will assume
that this is the computational mode we are given when we consider the ways of
adding fault-tolerance to dataflow. (Later we will consider how fault-tolerance
could be added if the computational mode were otherwise.) Firstly, however, we
will discuss the main features of tagged, demand-driven datafiow machines. The
important features of Lucid, as far as dataflow and this project are concerned,
will be discussed in a later section.
The architecture of a tagged, demand-driven datafiow machine might be as
shown in Figure 17. The machine consists of two unidirectional rings, around
which demand packets and term-value packets flow. Both rings pass through a
"pool" of processors, where processors are acquired to execute particular basic
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Figure 18. The Architecture of a Dataflow Machine.
operations of the language, to perform certain tag manipulations, and to trans-
late demands, for the tagged values of basic operations applied to arguments,
into "suspended operations" and demands for the tagged values of the operands.
(When the tagged values of the operands are produced, they are put into the
suspended operation and held there until the operation has a full complement
of operand values, at which time this completed suspended operation travels to
the processor pool to get a processor to execute the operation.) The important
thing to realize is that the computations proceed in a very piecemeal way, with
processors being picked up to perform very small computations, no bigger than a
single execution of a basic operation. Moreover, when the processor is picked up
the operands of the operation have already been evaluated, which means that the
processor is kept for only a few microseconds.
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3.2.1 Fault-tolerance
It is not really appropriate in this report to go into the detailed behavior of
datafiow machines. The last paragraph explained enough of the operation of a
machine to make the modification for fault-tolerance easily understood. The idea
is simply this: when a processor has to be picked up, to execute a basic operation,
modify a tag, produce new demands, etc., two processors should be picked up,
rather than one, and both should be set to work doing the same calculation. In
a few microseconds both processors should be finished. (If either of them is not
finished within a reasonable time, it can be assumed that the processor has failed,
and the corresponding result will be taken to be some failure flag.) The two results
can be compared by a third, distinct, processor. If they both give the same result,
this result is sent off around the appropriate ring. If they disagree, a fourth,
necessarily reliable, processor should be immediately grabbed and set to work on
the same minute computation. In a few microseconds it, too, will have finished,
and its result is the result which is sent around the rings. (This result can also
be used to determine which of the two original processors was in error (or even
if the third, arbitration processor falsely indicated that the first two processors
disagreed). The errant processor can then be immediately removed from the
pool of processors.) The computation can then proceed with a delay of a few
microseconds, well within the limits imposed by the fault-detection requirements.
One of the advantages of this technique, over the "conventional" fault-detect-
ion technique for Von Neumann machines, is that only double redundancy, not
triple, is required. (We are not counting the arbitration processor because it does
need not have all the capabilities of the other processors; all it does is check
whether two bit-strings are identical.) Only when a fault is detected, by two
processors disagreeing, is it necessary to call for a fourth, distinct, processor.
(This should happen rarely.) It is possible to do this because of the way that
dataflow machines naturally break their computations into minute pieces, and
because there are no side effects of evaluating these pieces. The only result of
such an evaluation is a single value, which can easily be compared with the result
of a duplicate evaluation. If the results disagree, no effects will have occurred to
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prevent a third processor from performing a fresh evaluation, from the original
data.
Another advantage is that dataflow machines naturally have several proces-
sors, and if one processor becomes defective and has to be taken out of service,
the machine will be essentially unchanged, and be ready to detect more errors.
Only when a large fraction of the total number of processors has been removed
from service will the machine become too slow to be able to function effectively.
The dataflow machine consists of more than just the pool of processors; it has
several other components, and data packages will be transmitted around the rings
in great numbers. Can not errors occur in the rest of the machine? The answer,
of course, is yes, but these errors will be different in kind than the errors produced
by defective processors. These errors will be data transmission errors, that can
be detected, and corrected, by conventional single error correction codes. The
special-purpose processors needed to do this error detection and correction can be
built into the hardware of the machine, with enough redundancy to be immune
to faults. (There has to be some level at which possible faults are disregarded.
For example, in this discussion we are assuming that the communication channels
between components of the machine are not going to be broken.)
For this to be a viable fault-tolerance technique in the context of applications
such as those underlying this project, the datafiow machine, when running without
any processor failures, must be able to perform real-time computations, where
the machine has to respond to inputs within certain precise timing constraints.
This will depend crucially on the language used to program the machine, on the
way programs are written, and on the degree to which the time behavior of the
machine can be determined by the programs. There is not a large number of
dataflow languages to choose from, but the language Lucid appears to be the best
language to choose. We will return to these questions after a discussion of the
language Lucid.
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3.3 Lucid
Although it looks imperative at first sight, Lucid is actually a functional
language. Therefore, as with all functional languages, it is a value language: it is
concerned with the values of variables. Normally this is as opposed to an object
language, which deals with objects that change with time. (In a value language
the values of variables are unchanging.) Lucid, however, can often be viewed as
an object language even though it is a value language.
3.3.1 Operational Ideas in Lucid
The (unchanging) values of variables in Lucid are actually infinite sequences,
but the variables should be thought of as objects that change with time. For
example, the Lucid definition
x = 1 fby x + 1
(the operator fby means followed by) defines the value of z to be the sequence <1,
2, 3, 4, ... > but it is natural and useful to think of the value of x as an object,
which is initially 1 and subsequently changes to 2, 3, 4, etc.
This simple idea has many consequences. It means that the language en-
joys all the advantages of a functional language, such as referential transparency,
provability etc., while retaining an operational iterative flavor. It means that
defined functions in Lucid are functions from infinite sequences to infinite se-
quences, which, in operational terms, means that they are filters that produce
outputs as inputs are fed in. Moreover these filters do not need to act 'pointwise'-
the output at any time need not just depend on the input at that time, it can
depend on all the previous inputs. For example, we can write a function that
outputs a running sum of the inputs, as follows
Sum(x) = s where
s----firstx fby s+nextx;
end;
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Operationally, the filter sum keeps around a local variable s (for each invocation
of sum, i.e., for each expression sum(e)), which "remembers" the running sum (of
e).
It also means that all Lucid programs are essentially continually operating
programs, which are given infinite sequences of inputs and produce infinite se-
quences of outputs. This doesn't mean that Lucid is only suited to special ap-
plications like process control or data processing; it just means that the operating
system would have to take special action if a Lucid program were to be a 'one off'
job, if it were required to give only a single result. (In the current implementation
of Lucid, this action is invoked when the system gets eod as input (eod stands for
end-of-data).) Nevertheless, it does mean that Lucid is well suited for the sorts of
applications that are relevant to this project.
3.3.2 Lucid as a Dataflow Language
If we consider the input to a dataflow network to be unending sequences
of data items, there will be unending sequences of data items flowing along the
edges of the network. Infinite sequences are at the semantic heart of Lucid, and
this suggests that there might be a correspondence between Lucid and dataflow
networks. In fact there is such a correspondence, and it is very close indeed.
Lucid has the pleasing property that every Lucid program is simply translatable
into a datafiow network, and every datafiow network is simply translatable into
a Lucid program. This is only true if we consider a particular class of datafiow
networks, but this class is sufficiently general to be considered as the class of
datafiow networks: all other classes of datafiow networks appear to be translatable
into this class.
In fact, the datafiow networks in the class corresponding to Lucid programs
do not use select and distribute nodes at all. (No select nodes are needed because
Lucid, as we will see, requires tagged dataflow, and distribute nodes are not needed
because computations are demand-driven and conditional evaluation is done using
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the operation if-then-else and the extraction of values from a loop is done using the
operation asa (which means as soon as).} This is a pleasing property, because the
distribute node is the only node, other than split, with more than one output edge.
Now dataflow networks are more syntactically uniform: a dataflow network is any
directed graph formed from operation nodes, function nodes, and split nodes. In
fact the dataflow network corresponding to a Lucid program uses only nodes that
come directly from the program itself (which is why the translation from Lucid
to dataflow networks is so trivial).
The Lucid networks use tagged dataflow, with the tags including a component
for Lucid-time. (We cannot consider Lucid-time as actual time; we have seen that
tagged dataflow allows us to have conceptual sequences that are not necessarily
evaluated in order, which is exactly what is required when implementing Lucid.)
Also the networks are demand-driven, rather than data-driven, for various reasons
which we will not go into here.
This adoption of the demand-driven approach is rather radical, since it is
contrary to the approach taken by most other dataflow researchers (although
several of them are coming to feel that they have to be able to handle demand-
driven computation). To some extent the demand-driven approach may require
more computation, to propagate demands, and, in many cases, the data-driven
approach causes no problems. This suggests that some sort of hybrid approach
would be better: a basically demand-driven approach with some data-driven
computation when it is heuristically determined that no computational excesses
will result. Some heuristics for use in such a hybrid system are easy to think of,
but further research is needed to come up with a comprehensive set.
3.4 Lucid, Demand-driven Evaluation and Fault-tolerance
In a Lucid program, the values of variables are actually infinite sequences,
and these sequences are generated as the computation of the program progresses.
Variables with no definitions are input variables, which take a sequence of values
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from the "outside world". Unlike the other variables in a program, the elements in
the sequence which is the value of an input variable are always demanded in order.
(This is ensured by the interpreter, which generates extra demands if a program
tries to access the elements of an input variable out of order.) This means that
the elements in the sequence for an input variable must actually be inputted in
order. For real time applications, it would be appropriate to modify the datafiow
machine so that every input variable v has associated with it another variable t,
which records the actual times (in milliseconds since system start-up) at which
the elements of v are inputted to the program. Using these variables it is possible
to make the behavior of a program depend on actual time.
Here is a simple program fragment which takes readings from an accelerometer
and produces values for velocity and distance (in the same direction as the ac-
celeration is measured). The original velocity and distance, when the readings of
the accelerometer are started, are VO and DO, respectively.
vel ----V0 fby vel -k acc× delta;
dist -- DO fby dist . vel× delta;
delta -- (next tact - t_¢¢)/1000;
The variable delta will give the times (in seconds) between successive readings of
the accelerometer. (It probably will be constant, i.e. be a constant sequence, but
the program works just as well if it is a varying sequence.) The variables acc,
delta, vel and dist can be used in any way one wishes. For example, if the program
contained the following definition
avg(x) -- mean where
mean -- x fby mean + d;
d -- (next x - mean)/(index . 2);
end;
(the Lucid constant index is the sequence _0,1,2,..._) then the expression avg(vel)
will give the running average velocity, which may well be a useful thing to know.
If there were readings of the rate of fuel consumption, taken at the same times as
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the accelerometer readings, represented by a variable fuelrate, then vel/fuelrate
will give the instantaneous "milage" (actually feet per gallon) and avg(vel/fuelrate)
will give the average milage. If the fuel tanks originally hold F gallons of fuel, the
expression
vel/fuelrate× left where
left ----F fby left - fuelrateX delta;
end
will give the distance that can be travelled if the present velocity is maintained.
(Actually, if the present fuel consumption is maintained.)
Thus there are many values that may be calculated, in a continuous way.
It is possible to have values that are conditionally updated. For example, we
could keep track of the distance travelled, once every five seconds. (This would
be appropriate for a visual display, which would be unreadable if it changed as
often as the accelerometer produced readings.) This could be defined by
display ---- if sawtooth eq 0 then dist else display fi
where
sawtooth ----0 fby if sawtooth _---- 5
then 0
else sawtooth + delta fi;
end;
We now must consider the operational behavior of the dataflow machine produced
by these definitions. The machine will be demand driven, but to get real-time
behavior we will link the actual time when demands for output are made to the
times that readings of acceleration and rate of fuel consumption are made. (This
is a simplifying assumption for this report. In fact, this assumption does not have
to be made, but the extra complications in explanation would just obscure the
points that are relevant here.) The demands for output will filter back, and the
actual readings will be inputted, but the actual readings will have been made at the
time the demands ,for output were made. Now, we are assuming that the output is
required very quickly, at least before the next demand for output is made. Thus
it must be assumed that the demands for output are made at sufficiently great
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intervals of time to allow the computation of each output to be completed before
the next demand for output is made. The problem comes when one of the outputs
required involves conditional evaluation, as is the case with display here. If the
variable dist is not used anywhere else, it would only be demanded when display
needs it, namely once every five seconds. To then get the required value of dist, all
the intervening values of dist must be calculated, corresponding to the times since
dist was last needed, five seconds previously. This will be a longer calculation
than usual, and may, in fact, be too long, and overlap with the next demand
for output. To get around this, dist should be evaluated continuously, as are
dir etc. This seems to go against the idea of demand-driven dataflow. In actual
fact, it is a good example of the benefits of having a hybrid type of evaluation
that involves data-driven evaluation when it is certain (as in this case) that the
values in question will eventually be needed anyhow, or when it is possible that the
values will be needed, and calculating them will not involve an excessive amount
of computation.
So what are the advantages of demand-driven computation in this context?
Surely we have just demonstrated that data-driven evaluation would have been
better? The advantage of demand-driven computation is that we can have different
types of demands. We can have urgent demands, for values needed right now, and
we can have less urgent demands for values, such as might be generated by the part
of the hybrid system that simulates data-driven computation. In this case, values
for dir, say, could be evaluated quickly, and the values of dist would be kept up to
date at a more leisurely pace, before the next demand for output comes in but not
necessarily as soon as possible after the previous demand for output came in. (The
advantages of having the two types of demands are more pronounced when the
demands for output are made at a lower rate than the rate at which readings are
made of the values on which these outputs will be based. Also, it will be natural in
practice to have some values whose speedy evaluation is more critical than others,
and this naturally fits in better with a multi-priority demand-driven evaluation
scheme than with a single priority data-driven scheme. (It is more natural to have
a multi-priority demand-driven scheme than a multi-priority data-driven scheme
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because the urgency attached to a particular computation comes from the top,
from the use that is going to be made of the results of the computation, rather
than from the bottom, from the basic operations comprising the computation.))
This is just one simple example of the way in which demand-driven evaluation
can be exploited to give greater real-time control over computations than is
possible with data-driven evaluation. As such, it is one reason for using a Lucid
datafiow machine. Another reason for using such a machine is that the machine
runs Lucid, which is a natural language for expressing dataflow computations.
3.4.1 Data-driven Fault-tolerance
The scheme for adding fault-tolerance to a datafiow machine did not depend
crucially on the machine being demand-driven. Exactly the same technique could
be used with a data-driven machine. The only drawback to using a data-driven
machine is that sufficient problems have been found with the data-driven approach
that there is now a trend towards the demand-driven approach, at least in some
contexts.
3.5 Conclusions
An elementary scheme has been outlined for adding fault-tolerance capabilities
to dataflow machines. The scheme will be tolerant of single failures of proces-
sors, either failure to produce results at all, or failures which result in the wrong
answers being produced. The recovery time when failures are detected is on the
order of microseconds, and the overhead for adding fault-tolerance is essentially
that twice as many processors are needed (otherwise the machine will compute at
approximately half the speed).
The benefits, in terms of reduced execution time, to be obtained from using
datafiow, by translating conventional programs into dataflow programs or by
interpreting conventional programs using an interpreter written in a dataflow
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language, together with the fault-tolerance capabilities that can be obtained, are
probably great enough to justify the effort and expense of doing the translation,
or of constructing the interpreter. The benefits of writing application programs
directly in a dataflow language like Lucid are even greater, and are definitely great
enough to justify the effort involved in learning to use such a language.
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Chapter 4
Automatic Generation of Aircraft Control Programs
Introduction
As digital electronic devices become cheaper, faster, more reliable and more
compact, there will be a continuing trend toward the replacement of the analog
electro-mechanical systems used in aircraft applications with newer digital systems
that provide similar functions. In particular, the aircraft control functions that
have traditionally been implemeted on an individual basis by "black box" analog
devices now can be realized using digital computation methods, and if desired,
consolidated into one or a few processing units. A given control function then
becomes one of a set of programs that are executed on a general-purpose computer,
possibly along with other programs that are unrelated to control processes.
The designer of new digital control programs faces much the same set of
problems as the analog system designer with respect to meeting the control func-
tion requirements that relate to process-dynamics, stability, etc. However, he has
a different set of problems with respect to the implementation of the system. The
limitations imposed by the characteristics of physical devices (e.g., speed, linearity,
and dynamic range of system components) translate into program properties such
4. AircraftControlPrograms 4.1. The Nature of the Problem
as execution speed and accuracy of arithmetic operations. The stability of feed-
back loops in the analog world becomes a problem of the numerical stability of
calculations in program loops. Questions of correct hardware implementation at
the circuit level correspond to issues of the correctness of a program with respect
to its flow-of-control structure and the details of its arithmetic processes.
In the subsequent sections we will examine the possibility that some of
the work involved in the development of aircraft control programs might be
automated or semi-automated. The plan initially would be to create a specialized
programming environment for the control system designer. This environment
would consist of a collection of software tools, each of which was designed to
support one or more of the different phases of control program specification, design
and implementation. At some future stage one would hope to integrate these tools
with some form of knowledge-based "expert system" that could provide advice on
all aspects of the program generation problem.
The main motivations for the employment of semi-automatic program genera-
tion methods are to reduce the time and cost of program development, and impor-
tantly, to increase the confidence that control programs are correct with respect
to their specified performance requirements.
4.1 The Nature of the Problem
The stages of development of either a process control system or a process
control program involve three distinct phases of activity that need to be carried
out in the following sequence.
1. Specification of the process to be controlled
2. Design of the control system
3. Implementation of the design
For a given required aircraft control program it may be the case that the specification,
or even the specification and the design already exist. This would be the situation
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if, for example, a satisfactory control system had already been constructed using
an analog realization, and what was needed was a control program that carries
out exactly the same function. For any completely new application, however, it
will be necessary for a control program designer to address each of the three tasks
above.
What is involved in these three activities? First, with respect to system
specification, in Tou's book on control theory [2], he lists the parts of a control
system specification as including:
a. Dynamics of the control process
b. Input signals and desired output signals
c. External disturbances
d. Tolerable error and degree of stability
Note that these properties are essentially independent of any assumptions about
the method of control system design or its form of implementation. The above
items actually comprise four areas of functional specification, and would usually
be expressed in a mixture of formal and informal descriptive terminology. For
example, input signals may be easy to characterize very precisely by referring to
manufacturers data on sensor devices. Other properties such as the dynamics of
the process may be harder to describe in a formal way. Such a partial specification
might be: It should "feel good" to the pilot. Informally expressed specifications
are difficult to deal with in a semi-automatic way because they usually lack preci-
sion and completeness. One possible solution to the partial automation of the
specification task would be to provide the designer with a formal specification lan-
guage such as SPECIAL [3]. Another approach employing programming "templates"
will be described later.
The design of a control system to meet the functional specifications may or
may not presume a particular form of implementation. For example a design could
be specified by exhibiting a set of differential equations and associated boundary
values that express the desired time dependency of the system inputs and outputs-
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but without saying just how the equations should be solved by hardware devices.
Alternatively, a design could be expressed by giving a circuit diagram description
of the actual hardware to be used to carry out the control process. In either case
the design itself contitutes a second level of specification of the desired control
behavior (now in a more formal terminology) that must be satisfied by the chosen
form of implementation. The design phase is probably the most difficult of the
three to automate because it involves engineering knowledge, experience, intuition,
and physical and mathematical reasoning. Some of this expertise can be captured
in useful form by maintaining a data base of descriptive material and programs
corresponding to previous successful designs. We will comment on this later.
Implementation of a design carries out the transition from a specification
in terms of a system design to a physical realization. In the case that the
implementation is a control program rather than another "black box" then there is
some presumed underlying hardware device e.g., a minicomputer that the program
needs for its execution. The control program designer should not need to influence
the design of that processor. All that he should need to know is that it has
the capabilities to execute his program at a desired speed and with satisfactory
numerical accuracy. The transition from the design to a program implementation
is perhaps the easiest of the three phases to accomplish in an automatic fashion.
Once the design is expressed in terms of formal mathematical notation or (network
terminology) it is not difficult to construct one or more translators that can
accept such descriptions and produce as output a high level language program
that "realizes" the design. These translators are nothing more than compilers
that convert from one formal language into another.
4.2 Concerning Hardware-and Why?
When considering possible approaches to the automatic generation of flight-
control programs, it should be kept in mind that this activity probably will
not produce any practical results for three to five years. During that time one
can expect a considerable improvement in the available digital hardware that
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eventually would be used to implement control systems. It is certain that there will
be substantial increases in hardware speed, improved memory capabilities, more
specialized computational devices (e.g., signal-processors, floating-point arithmetic
units, etc.) and, of course, lower costs. These projections have a strong impact on
the feasibility of using automated schemes for control program construction and
code generation. Two important aspects of the expected hardware advances are:
4.2.1 Machine Arithmetic
Consider the question of the arithmetic capabilities of a processor that sup-
ports and runs a control program. In the very early days of digital computa-
tion, the programmers of numerical software suffered intensely by not having fast
floating-point arithmetic. They were forced by machine limitations to work with
fixed-point number representations, and this lead to many tedious problems with
the scaling of variables used in computations. Until quite recently the situation
was similar for those intending numerical work on small computers based on, say
8 or 16 bit microprocessors. To write control programs to run on such a machine
one must use very careful and rather sophisticated reasoning to make sure that
the problems of
• Out of range values
• Overflow/underflow
• Catastrophic cancellation
• Loss of accuracy
will not occur in the running program. The skills, judgement and experience
necessary to construct correct programs for fixed-point numerical calculations are
difficult to capture in a form that could be used in automatic program generation.
For example, such a simple program statement as
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may be "safe" to use only because the programmer knows the physics of the
problem and realizes that the values of a and b will always be in a range such
that arithmetic overflow will not occur on addition of the two quantities. If an
automatic program generator were to create many similar arithmetic statements
in the course of computing some state-variable, then it would be unreasonable to
expect it to employ human-like intuitive physical reasoning to decide whether the
statement was safe.
The situation is quite different if one assumes that future control programs
will be executed on hardware that supports fast floating-point arithmetic. Current-
ly there is an IEEE standard, see Ref. [4,5], for a reasonable set of floating-point
representations, and a precisely defined semantics for the associated arithmetic
operations. A number of semiconductor manufacturers are already offering IC
parts that conform to these rules and provide very fast floating-point capabilities.
For control programs that deal with real physical processes it is rarely the
case that the state-variables of the process can be measured (or need to be known}
to more than three or four decimal digits of accuracy. A possible exception is the
task of inertial navigation, if indeed that can be called a control process. In this
instance, the FAA requirements for navigational accuracy lead to distance cal-
culations needing about six decimal digits of precision. Otherwise, if control pro-
grams can be assumed to use floating-point arithmetic having moderately accurate
numerical representations (say 32 bits}, then almost all of the subtleties of pro-
gramming caused by the the above mentioned difficulties with fixed-point calcula-
tions dissappear. For most practical purposes the execution of a program state-
ment involving arithmetic operations on program variables can be assumed to yield
results that conform to the "mathematical" semantics of the statement operating
on a domain of program variables that is equivalent to the "mathematical" reals.
The above facts have a pleasant impact on prospects for automatic program
generation. The crucial point is that one may consider a process to be well specified
if it is described in terms of mathematical symbology, formulas or equations. One
has the prospect of doing various formal symbolic manipulations of mathematical
statements into equivalent program statements without any concerns about purely
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arithmetic problems. Moreover, as will be developed in more detail later, there
are possibilities for using just a few standard methods for handling a wide variety
of control problems.
4.2.2 Speed of computation
Now consider some of the consequences of the trend toward the availability
of devices with higher and higher speeds of computation. The computational
load on an aircraft control program usually will be proportional to the rate at
which control outputs must be generated in order to maintain stability of the
aircraft. These output rates differ considerably, depending on the control function.
For, say pitch control on a large aircraft, rates of a few iterations of the control
program per second are adequate. For something like dynamic flutter-control of
an aerodynamically unstable wing, rates as high as 50 to 100 iterations per second
have been considered. Since these computational iteration rates depend essentially
on such mechanical properties of the aircraft as the resonant frequencys of the
wing structure, it is not likely that they will increase significantly in the near
future. On the other hand, the available speed of computation for microprocessors
and other digital devices can be expected to increase several fold during the next
few years. As a consequece, one can expect that for future control programs there
will be ample time for computation even at high iteration rates.
The importance of high computation speed to automatic control program
generation is that it presents the opportunity to create programs that are not
particularly elegant or efficient but do rely on simple computational processes
that are much the same for differing control problems. For example, most control
system implementations depend on integration of time varying state-variables.
When such integrations are carried out numerically (rather than by an analog
device) the accuracy and numerical stability of the computation depends strongly
on the time interval between samples of the integrand. At the expense of more
computation, a smaller interval can be used, and a simpler integration rule. This
can simplify the process of translating a specification of function into a program
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for doing the calculation. Another case of interest occurs when a device like a
compensator or filter is specified in terms of a given electrical network. Here,
rather than attempt to derive a mathematical expression for the network transfer
function, one might construct a program that repeatedly computes all of the
network's node voltages and mesh currents. The same effect is achieved as that of
computing a derived transfer function but at the expense of a greater amount of
computation. If the extra computation can be afforded, then the passage from a
specification in terms of a network to an equivalent program realization becomes
more straightforward and probably less error prone.
4.3 An Environment for Control Program Generation
In a programming environment designed specifically for control program
composition, the separate phases of control program generation discussed above
call for different forms of support tools for each of the activities of
• System Specification
• System Design
• Design Implementation.
Taken together, the tools should provide a programming environment that makes
it easier to carry out the different steps necessary for the program development.
In creating the tools, it is important to consider how they can be structured
to take maximum advantage of knowledge that resides in previously solved control
problems and their implementations. One does not want to have to start from
scratch with each new control problem. Instead, the programming environment
should support the capabilities to recover and reuse any relevant prior work, and
to do so in ways that are easy for the user to manage. Several methods and
facilities that could be provided to support this policy are
• The use of several standard forms of template-like data structures that can be
used in program development, and also used to store either partial or complete
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information about parts of a control program.
• Structure oriented text-editors that help one to make incremental modifications
to previously existing programs or program segments, and incorporate these
"parts" into a developing program.
• A library of standard numerical procedures or frequently used code-fragments
that can be recalled and inserted as function calls or macros in a program that
is being composed. Included should be reliable routines for matrix eigenvalue
computation and for the solution of polynomial equations. The latter are useful
(perhaps essential) to determine values for those design parameters that affect
system stability.
• One or more compilers (or translators) that accept program descriptions in
symbolic structured-data format and generate executable programs expressed
in a high order language such as FORTRAN or Pascal.
The notion of using standard templates for storing and composing control
programs is attractive because there are many similarities that extend across
all aircraft control applications. For example the programs are all iterative in
execution, they all require an initialization phase, they usually have several modes
of operation depending on aircraft state, and always read information from sensors
and issue commands to actuators. Other similarities occur in the nature of the
internal calculations that are carried out, where often the same general type of
dynamic process is being modeled by different control programs. In the latter case,
two programs might differ significantly only with respect to the parameterization
of some standard computational procedure.
Three forms of template suggest themselves as being useful for different
aspects of the program development. First, a data structure based on a two or
more dimensional partitioning of "space" into pigeon- holes in much the same
manner as the business-oriented "spreadsheet" programs. This would be useful
in the specification and design phases of program generation. The idea is to use
the spreadsheet mechanism to name, record, and identify numerical relationships
between the "objects" that will be referred to in the eventual program. Such
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objects are, for example, input and output devices, state-variables, and modes of
control. The spreadsheet format can be used to associate values, scale-factors,
dimensions, limits, etc., that are part of a specification, with the corresponding
identifiers in the actual control program. This format also is convenient for
specifying or describing the flight mode conditions. For example, one can fill in
names and mathematical relations of the form
modea : (airspeed > 120) A (altitude < 200)
This gives a name to the mode contemplated and states the conditions under which
the mode obtains. In the case that many modes are specified with complicated
dependencies, it would be possible to have an automatic tool that checks the
supplied data for consistency of the mode descriptions.
A second form of template that may be useful is a set of standardized control
program formats. These could be used either to construct complete working
programs or, partially completed, to store useful parts of programs future use.
The plausibility of constructing these program templates depends on the fact that
control programs tend to have rather similar forms of structure and content, so
that several programs actually may have the same generic pattern. To illustrate,
a program template written in a Pascal-like syntax might look something like the
following.
Program Template i.
procedure control(var firstime: boolean);
var mode: (ml..mn); (1)
exitcondition: boolean;
otherlocals : .... ;
procedure initialize; (2)
begin ... end;
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procedure compute-mode; (3)
begin ... end;
begin
if firstime then begin (4)
initialize;
firstime := false
end;
repeat (5)
read(input,sensors);
compute-mode;
case mode of
ml: begin codel end;
m2: begin code2 end;
mn: begin coden end
end;
write(output,effectors);
wait(epsilon)
until exitcondition
end;
This template (or somethingrather similarin form) could "match" the control
structure and computationalstyle of many simplecontrol programs. The var
declarationsbeginningat (1)givenamesand typesto variablesto be mentioned
in the program body. These declarationscould be created with the help of
the spreadsheettype of specificationdiscussedabove. Similarly,the procedure
initilize, starting at (2), can be automaticallygeneratedby using initial values
suppliedwhen variableswere specifiedand named in the first phase,or created
by the secondphase. The procedurecompute-mode,starting at (3) alsocan be
automaticallyconstructedfrom the spreadsheetrepresentation•
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At program entry, point (4), initialization occurs for the first call of the con-
trol procedure and is subsequently disabled. Following this there is a repeated loop
that iterates the computation corresponding to a selected mode. The segments
designated as codel, code2 ... carry out the actual computations that correspond
to different control laws for the different modes. These segments must be sup-
plied by "borrowing" code from previous programs or by a creative process that
only partially can be automated. More discussion of this phase will be found in
the following section. The use of program templates should be valuable because
automatic checking mechanisms can be devised to prompt the user into supplying
all of the information necessary to produce a syntatically correct program in the
high level language of choice.
A third form of template that would be useful as a semi-automatic program-
ming aid is a data representation form for symbolic matrices. The motivation
is that most of the standard methods of control process design involve reasoning
about state changes of the system that are expressed in notations of the general
form
X'=MxX
Here, X and X' are vectors whose elements are input, output and internal state-
variables (and their time derivatives) and M denotes a state-transition matrix that
relates the current state X to the state at the next "instant" of time. The above
formulation can be viewed either as a system of first order differential equations or
as a set of finite-difference equations where the implicit time variable t increases
by discrete increments delta. In the latter case the increment delta may be the
interval between iterations of the main loop in the control program.
If a given control law or design is expressed in symbolic form as a matrix
equation representing the discrete time-step interpretation, then it is particularly
easy to translate this representation into a sequentially executed high level lan-
guage program. All that is necessary is that the translator accept the symbolic
data structure representing the matrix equation and use the standard matrix-
product rule to generate program statements that implement the corresponding
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arithmetic on the symbolic program names. Since the matrix M is usually sparse,
the translator can omit compiling statements involving multiplication by the zero-
elements of M, and thus produce a more efficient code implementation than would
be provided by a "full" matrix multiplication algorithm.
Another reason for wanting symbolic matrix templates is that useful parts
of prior control system designs may exist that are expressed in the form of state-
diagrams, circuit-diagrams or electrical networks. The easiest way of capturing
this knowledge in a form that is suitable for automatic translation into program
code is to treat the diagrams or circuits as directed graphs where nodes of the
graph are given names identified with state-variables, and edges of the graph
correspond to relations between the connected pair of nodes and their associated
state-variable values. With some help from symbolic data-manipulation routines,
it should be relatively easy to transform a state-diagram representation or a
network realization into a transition matrix that expresses the "next state" of the
system in the same form as that required by the discrete time-step calculations
described above. For passive linear electrical networks expressed in either circuit-
diagram or Laplace transform style, there are standard techniques that can be
used to obtain the transition-matrix representation.
4.4 An Illustrative Example
In order to illustrate these ideas in a somewhat more concrete context, let's
examine one typical form of aircraft control problem to see how the use of the
proposed programming environment in the system design process leads to formal
representations that could be used by an automatic program generator. This will
be a very oversimplified "toy" example, but it will contain the essential ingredients
of many control system design problems.
Consider the problem of flutter-control for an aircraft that has an aerodynami-
cally unstable wing structure (see Figure 18). In flight the wing is subjected to
a time-varying perturbing force, shown as P(t), that creates a bending moment
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about the wing root. Tile designer/user wants to compensate for this disturbance
and the known wing instability by varying the angle of a small aileron positioned
somewhere along the trailing edge of the wing. He might know that it is possible
to make the simplifying assumption that the wing can be physically modeled by
an elastic cantelever beam with center of mass CM. He might conclude that the
mechanical properties of the wing are such that it is only necessary to consider
the fundamental mode of vibration of the wing in the y direction and that all of
the higher-order vibrational modes, torsional modes etc., can be ignored in the
control system design. He might also conclude that a single sensor that measures
wing deflection will suffÉce as a control input.
Figure 19. An Aerodynamically Unstable Wing Structure.
The most difficult steps to automate are those that require engineering know-
ledge and experience. The previous paragraph, which was an informal partial
specification of the control problem, already contains a number of insights and
judgements about how the system can be modeled. This type of knowledge is
difficult to capture in heuristic form, but it might be elicited by a knowledge-
based "expert system" through interactive inquiries to the user. Even a non-expert
system can provide the capability to browse through previously stored design and
specification descriptions in search of pertinent or useful partial solutions.
At this stage, the designer may decide that the problem is similar to that
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of roll-control, and decide to use the program template previously used for that
purpose. This could be very like the program template discussed in the section
above. He then proceeds to supply information required by the various parts of the
program. To fill out the appropriate spreadsheets he would be obliged to supply
names and specifications for input and output devices used by the program. This
might be done by giving the name y (which is actually wing deflection) to the
signal value of a particular type of strain guage that appears in the spreadsheet
along with manufacturers data on its characteristics. Similarly he may assign the
name theta to the deflection angle produced by some already specified actuator
device, and designate that as a program output.
Proceeding in this way, he must next describe the modes of the control
system. This might take the following form
supersonic _ airspeed > 600
subsonic = (airspeed < 600) A (airspeed > 120)
landing = airspeed < 120
This gives names to three control modes which in the designer's judgement require
different control laws and therefore different program treatment. At this point
he realizes that airspeed is also an input to the program and returns to the
input/output specification to supply the name airspeed to one of the aircraft
devices that measure it.
After one or more iterations of this specification process, the designer is ready
to consider the actual design details of the control system. Reasoning by analogy
with the previous roll-control problem that is known to be similar he might choose
to look at the control law descriptions that have previously been used in that
application. He may decide to borrow one of those implementations or, since the
dynamics are so simple for this problem, he might just write out a differential
equation for the control law by summing moments about the wing root. Such a
relation might look like
m xCM×ddy+kl xdy+k2xy--L1 XP(t)+L2xF(t)
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here dy and ddy are the first and second derivitives of the wing deflection y
respectively, m is the wing mass, F(t) is the force due to the aileron, L1 and L2
have the dimension length, and finally, kl and k2 are constants that depend partly
on mechanical properties of the wing and partly on the assumed short-term gain
of the control system. This equation introduces two new state-variables, ddy and
dy, as names of program values, and the programming system should at this point
inquire about their initial values. Also the functions P(t) and F(t) have not been
defined, so the designer should supply some function definitions at this point. Say,
F(t) "-"A(mode) X airspeed X sin(theta)
P(t) -- U(t)
where U(t) stands for the unit step function of perturbation and A introduces a
new program variable that depends on flight mode.
At this point the programming system's symbolic manipulation facilities
could be used to generate the transition matrix of the control law and to request
values for the design parameters kl and k2 and A. Either an automatic polynomial
solver or a matrix-eigenvalue routine can then be invoked to give the characteristic
roots of the system that determine its stability. The designer may use the latter
tool in a "cut-and-try" iterative fashion to converge on system parameters that
give what he regards as satisfactory dynamic behavior. He will repeat this exercise
three times, one for each of the control modes previously specified. Finally, an
automatic translator can be used to convert the now determined transition-matrix
representations into executable code sequences that fit into the case-statement
part of the program template.
Some details have been omitted in the foregoing scenario, either deliberately
because they seemed inessential, or because we have overlooked important difficult-
ies. In any event the above general style of interaction with a specialized pro-
gramming invironment is suggestive that progress can be made in semi-automatic
control generation.
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4.5 Concerning Accuracy
Onemay inquire whether the replacement of analog-style devices with digital
devices might introduce unforseen problems caused by the accumulation of error
through round-off or truncation of values while the many arithmetic operations
are carried out. It turns out that for any control system that was designed to
be stable against small environmental perturbations (say noise), that system will
also be stable against any small arithmetic errors. This fact can be proved quite
generally for all linear systems, and is undoubtedly true as well for stable nonlinear
ones. The reason is that a stable computation has the property that the current
state is very weakly dependent on states in the remote past-that is, history gets
attenuated. Consequently, although errors occur continuously they never can
accumulate to a significant value.
4.6 Conclusions and Recommendations
Control programs constitute a rather limited sub-class of the complete spect-
rum of numerical software. They share a number of similarities in form, purpose,
content and accuracy requirements that allow the construction of such programs
to be partitioned into a set of well defined subtasks. Most of the subtasks (that
are not related to human creativity in the design phase) are not too complex, and
usually can be handled using one or a few standard methods.
For the above reasons, the prospects for semi-automatic program generation
seem considerably better for control programs than for more general numerical
software construction. One at least can see how semi-automatic methods could
be applied to the different phases of control program generation. However, con-
siderable research needs to be done in several areas before any substantial results
will emerge.
Two critical areas are the organization of expert knowledge and the specific-
ation of control dynamics. Ways need to be found to organize the kind of reasoning
that is involved in the choice of a control law for a particular problem, selection
- 88 -
4. Aircraft Control Programs 4.6. Conclusions
of internal state- variables etc. With regard to specification of control dynamics,
there are criteria such as
• Don't subject the passengers to unpleasantly large accelerations.
that are relatively easy to specify by stating limits on control function outputs.
To meet these requirments by a semi-automated design process, however, seems to
require an iterative design approach that would make use of simulation to verify
the system properties. This is an area of research that needs to be investigated.
There are other types of specification such as
• Optimize the control law with respect to fuel consumption
that we don't yet know how to deal with in semi-automatic fashion. There are
some well developed mathematical techniques for treating such problems, see for
example Sage [6], but their applicability in a programming environment seems
difficult and needs to be explored.
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